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I. Introduction
Federal law allows for the removal from state court to federal court of any
case that originally would have qualified for federal jurisdiction,' either by
federal question2 or diversity3 jurisdiction. The general removal statute sets
forth various time frames and deadlines for when a party must notice removal.4
One of these time limits states that "a case may not be removed on the basis of
jurisdiction conferred by Section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after
commencement of the action."5 Section 1332 defines diversity jurisdiction.6
Thus, the one-year provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (§ 1446(b)) seems to
mandate that, if the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship,
a defendant may not remove more than one year after the commencement of the
case.
7
-This one-year time limit allows a plaintiff to engage in manipulative
gamesmanship in order to defeat remoVal. Consider the following hypothetical:
Plaintiff from State Xgets into a car accident within the borders of State Xwith
Defendant, a resident of State Y. Plaintiff suffers serious physical injury and
wants to sue Defendant solely under a state-law tort claim for $100,000.
Because the two parties have diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy
is greater than $75,000, the case qualifies for federal diversity jurisdiction.8 If
Plaintiff files the suit "as is" in the courts of State X, Defendant may remove the
case to federal district court in State X.9 Plaintiff is fully aware of this
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (setting forth the requirements for removal).
2. See id. §1331 (providing for federal jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
3. See id. §1332 (providing for federal jurisdiction of state law claims when the amount
in controversy is greater than $75,000 and the adverse parties are completely diverse).
4. See, e.g., id. § 1446(b) (requiring that a defendant notice removal within thirty days of
receiving the initial pleading); id. § 1446(c)(1) (requiring notice of removal within thirty days of
arraignment in state court for any criminal case).
5. Id. § 1446(b).
6. See id. § 1332 (defining diversity of citizenship).
7. See, e.g., Hedges v.. Hedges Gauging Serv., 837 F. Supp. 753, 755 (M.D. La. 1993)
(refusing to allow a defendant to remove after one year has passed when the only basis for
federal jurisdiction was diversity). But see Shiver v. Sprintcom, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 962,963-
64 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (applying an equitable exception to the one-year time limit, thus allowing
removal after the one-year anniversary).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(2000) (defining diversity of citizenship and mandating that the
amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 in order to qualify for federal diversity
jurisdiction).
9. See id. §1441(a) (providing that a case may be removed to "the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending");
see also Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
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procedure and wants to remain in state court. Thus, Plaintiff finds some way to
join' a defendant from State X-perhaps the owner of the car that the
defendant was driving at the time of the accident-in the suit, which destroys
the complete diversity necessary for removal." In reality, Plaintiff does not
really want to pursue the claim against the nondiverse defendant and is keeping
her in the suit merely to wreck diversity and prevent removal. Then, after a
year has passed from the filing of the suit, Plaintiff settles with or otherwise
drops the nondiverse defendant from the action. Once again, complete
diversity exists, but a year has passed and the removal statute seems to
foreclose the remaining defendant from gaining access to the federal courts.
The plaintiff's actions are clearly manipulative and the situation is
arguably unfair for the remaining defendant. 12 The remaining defendant is
stuck in state court and still may want to get into the federal forum.' 3 The
question remains, however, whether, in the face of such manipulative action by
the plaintiff, the defendant should still have access to the federal courts after a
year has passed. Stated differently, should the courts apply some form of
equitable exception to the one-year time limit in the event that the plaintiff
manipulatively acts only to defeat removal?
This situation and resulting question arose in Tedford v. Warner-Lambert
Co. 14 In fact, this question has surfaced many times before Tedford, with some
andFederal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 389 (1992) (finding that 69% of all
cases removed from state court to federal court in 1987 were diversity-based cases). States do
not keep track of how many cases filed in their courts actually qualify for diversity jurisdiction,
thus making an accurate determination of the percentage of diversity-qualified cases that are
removed impossible. Id. at 385.
10. See FED. R. CIv. P. 20 (stating that a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one
action if the claims against each defendant arise out of the same transaction or occurrence).
11. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 70-72 (1996) (stating that proper
diversity-based removal requires that complete diversity exist at the time of removal).
12. See, e.g., Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal; 53 CATH. U. L. REv.
609, 645-47 (2004) (calling the nondiverse defendant in this situation a "bogus part[y]" and
arguing that this gamesmanship is unfair to the remaining defendant).
13. Compare EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIvERsrrY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 127 (1992) (describing the desire to remove or remain in
state court by stating in the diversity context that, "The nature of the forum [helps] determine
both the likelihood that plaintiffs might win and, if they did, the amounts they would receive.")
with Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1672-73 (1992) (discussing the various arguments for
abolishing diversity jurisdiction, which include, among others, insufficient proof of local bias in
state court and the non-outcome determinative nature of forum choice).
14. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2003) (deciding
whether to provide equitable relief to a defendant that was arguing that the plaintiff's
gamesmanship prevented the defendant from exercising the right of removal). In Tedford, the
original plaintiffs, Tedford and Castro, were citizens of Texas, from Eastland County and
1317
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district courts allowing removal and others refusing to allow removal after a
year has passed. 15 The Tedford court, however, was the first circuit court of
appeals to directly address the issue,1 6 and concluded that the time limit is
subject to an equitable exception in the face of manipulative conduct. 17 In
almost all cases, the central debate is whether to adhere strictly to the language
of the removal statute or to negate a plaintiff's gamesmanship by recognizing
an equitable exception to the time limit.
18
Johnson County respectively. Id. They filed a products liability suit in Texas state court against
Warner-Lambert, the manufacturer of the prescription drug Rezulin, as well as against Dr.
Johnson, a citizen of Johnson County. Id. The initial complaint did not specify which plaintiff
Dr. Johnson treated, but Warner-Lambert learned that Dr. Johnson treated only Castro and
moved in state court to sever the two plaintiffs. Id. at 424-25. The state court granted Warner-
Lambert's motion and transferred Tedford's claim to Eastland County. Id. at 425. Warner-
Lambert informed Tedford that the company intended to remove the case to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction as Warner-Lambert was not a Texas citizen and Dr. Johnson was
not a proper defendant in Tedford's claim. Id. Three hours later, Tedford amended her
complaint to add as a defendant her own doctor, Dr. DeLuca, a citizen of Eastland County. Id.
Warner-Lambert, arguing that the doctor was fraudulently joined, removed the case to federal
court. Id. The federal court, however, rejected Warner-Lambert's argument and remanded the
case to state court. Id. The case proceeded between Tedford and Warner-Lambert, and at some
point before the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the case, Tedford signed and postdated
a Notice of Nonsuit against Dr. DeLuca without ever taking discovery from Dr. DeLuca. Id.
Tedford notified Warner-Lambert of the nonsuit after the one-year anniversary, and Warner-
Lambert again removed the case to federal court ten days after the anniversary. Id. Upon
Tedford's motion to remand on the basis that the one-year time limit barred removal, the federal
court applied an equitable exception because it found that Tedford had engaged in forum
manipulation. Id. at 428-29.
15. Compare Jenkins v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 965 F. Supp. 861, 869 (N.D. Miss. 1997)
(refusing to allow removal after the one-year anniversary), and Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co.,
921 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (refusing to reach the issue of whether diversity
was present because the removal had occurred more than one year after the commencement of
the action), with Shiver v. Sprintcom, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 962, 963-64 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(applying an equitable exception to the one-year time limit, thus allowing removal after the one-
year anniversary), and Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 601-03
(N.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that the one-year bar is subject to an equitable exception, but refusing
to apply the exception because the defendant had not vigilantly pursued its own interests).
16. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 425-26 (recognizing that this opinion would be the first
published circuit court opinion directly addressing the question of an equitable exception as
applied to the one-year removal bar). But see Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097
n. 12 (11 th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging the possibility of plaintiff misuse inherent in the time
limit, but eventually asserting that the one-year time limit was a jurisdictional mandate rather
than a congressional suggestion).
17. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 426-27 (holding that the one-year time limit is subject to an
equitable exception).
18. See, e.g., Brock v. Syntex Labs., 791 F. Supp. 721, 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1992)
(highlighting the debate of whether the time limit is jurisdictional, and thus an unbending
mandate, or procedural, and thus subject to an equitable exception).
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The plaintiff in Tedford initially filed a products liability suit with another
plaintiff, but the state court severed the two claims.' 9 After the severance, the
defendant notified the plaintiff that it intended to remove the case to federal
court on the basis of diversity.20 Three hours later, the plaintiff amended her
complaint to join her doctor as a defendant, which destroyed complete
diversity. 21 Some time later, the plaintiff signed and postdated a Notice of
Nonsuit against the doctor, but did not file it until after the one-year mark.22
The remaining defendant removed the case to federal court, and when the
plaintiff asserted the one-year time limit, the defendant argued that the court
should recognize an equitable exception to the time limit because of the
plaintiff's manipulative practices.23 The district court agreed and retained
jurisdiction even though removal had occurred more than one year after the
commencement of the action.24 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
district court and held that the one-year time limit was subject to an equitable
25exception.
This Note will discuss the merits of the equitable exception applied in
Tedford. Part II of this Note analyzes the removal and diversity statutes by
examining their language, detailing their respective histories, and presenting the
stated policies behind the time limit. Part III presents the different ways that
courts have treated the question of whether the one-year time limit is subject to
an equitable exception and points out the divergence of analysis between those
courts that reject the equitable exception and those courts that accept the
exception. Then, in Part IV, this Note evaluates the suggested revision to the
removal statute propounded by the American Law Institute (ALI).26 Part V
considers the impact and implications of an equitable exception by focusing on
post-Tedford decisions within the Fifth Circuit to demonstrate the lack of
uniformity and predictability inherent in leaving the decision to individual
judges. Part VI synthesizes all of the separate pieces of this issue into possible
19. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 424 (describing the initial suit in state court).
20. See id. at 425 (explaining the events that led to complete diversity existing).
21. See id. (discussing the addition of the doctor to destroy diversity).
22. See id. (stating the circumstances of the doctor's dismissal from the suit).
23. See id. (describing the argument that occurred at the removal hearing in federal court).
24. See id. (explaining the district court's decision to retain jurisdiction).
25. See id. at 424 (agreeing with the district court and applying an exception to the time
limit).
26. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 339-41,453 (2004) (proposing a deletion
of the one-year time limit in § 1446(b) in favor of a new provision in § 1447--new § 1447(b)-
that would leave the decision to allow removal after a year has passed up to the district judge's
discretion "in the interest of justice").
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implications for the future of removal practice. Finally, Part VII concludes that,
in light of the plain language of the statute, the deeply entrenched history of
removal, and the practical implications of an equitable exceptibn, neither
Congress nor the courts should allow equity to play a role in the one-year time
limit.
IT Statutory Construction
The starting point in the analysis of whether equitable principles play a
role in the removal time limit is the statute that creates the time limits. 27 The
requirements, qualifications, and procedures for removal are codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441-1448,28 with the time limit in question found at § 1446(b).29
Before analyzing the statutes themselves, this Note must establish the
methodology for the analysis. The scholarship shows that the methods of
statutory construction are varied and that the seemingly empirical endeavor of
statutory analysis depends, in many cases, on the desired result of the individual
interpreter. 30  Reasonable and intelligent minds can differ on the point of
whether the one-year time limit is subject to an equitable exception. 31 Thus,
this Part does not argue that the language of the statute definitely does or does
not allow for an equitable exception or that the legislative histories provide any
clear answer to the question. Rather, this Part simply states and parses the
language of the relevant statutes and then presents the history of the removal
statute and of diversity jurisdiction. At the end of this Part, this Note presents
two competing conclusions that arise as a result of the statutory analysis and it
adopts the conclusion that goes against the Tedford decision.
27. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. .337, 340-41 (1997) (stating that the
starting point for addressing an issue is the statute itself).
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1448 (2000).
29. See id. § 1446(b) (prescribing various time limits for when a party must notice
removal).
30. See, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain Language Rule ofStatutory
Construction: How and Why, 65 MoNT. L. REv. 229,236-37 (2004) (discussing the failure of
the plain language rule of statutory construction to yield uniform and predictable results and
stating that "how the rule functions varies dramatically from case to case, depending on the
jurist and/or type of case").
31. Compare Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (holding that the plain language of the statute does not allow for an equitable exception to
the one-year time limit) with Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 601-
03 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that the statute does not prohibit courts from applying equitable
considerations to the enforcement of the one-year time limits).
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A. Plain Language
The "Procedure for Removal" section of the removal statute is located at
§ 1446.32 Section 1446(a) provides the necessary content of the removal
petition and designates the correct federal court to which the removing party
must notice removal.33 The first paragraph of § 1446(b) states that, in a civil
action, the removing party must notice removal within thirty days of receipt of
the initial pleading in the action.34 Alternatively, if state law allows for the
filing of a claim without delivery of a copy of the pleading to all parties, the
party wishing to remove must notice removal within thirty days of receipt of
summons.35 Of these alternatives, the operative time period is whichever one is
shorter.36
The second paragraph of § 1446(b) contains the time limit that this Note
discusses.37 This paragraph states:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is
one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be
removed on the basis ofjurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title
38more than 1 year after commencement of the action.
At the outset, this paragraph confines itself to cases that are not initially
removable.39 In other words, this paragraph deals only with cases in which the
initial pleading in state court joins a nondiverse defendant, requests less than
$75,000, is unclear about whether the claim arises from federal or state law, or
is unclear as to the citizenship of a particular party.n° If any of these factors are
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2000).
33. See id. § 1446(a) (requiring that the removal petition be filed in the federal district
court for the district and division in which the state court sits, contain a plain statement of the
grounds for removal, and be signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
34. See id. § 1446(b) (setting forth the time frame for removal at the onset of a suit).
35. Id. (providing the procedure for removal when state law allows delayed service of
process).
36. Id. (mandating the operative time limit to determine when removal must occur).
37. See id. (providing a one-year cap on the availability of removal in situations in which
the case was not initially subject to removal).
38. Id.
39. See id. ("If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable ..
40. See, e.g., Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that a nondiverse defendant's presence rendered the case not initially removable);
Cofer v. Horsehead Research & Dev. Co., 805 F. Supp. 541, 542 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (explaining
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present, the pleading does not contain the requirements for federal jurisdiction,
whether it is based on a federal question or diversity,41 and, thus, the case is not
removable on the face of the complaint.42
In the instance of an initially unremovable case, something may occur
subsequent to the initial pleading that allows the case to meet the requirements
for federal jurisdiction.43 If such an occurrence happens, the second paragraph
of § 1446(b) gives the party that wishes to remove thirty days from the date that
the party learns of the occurrence that allows for federal jurisdiction to notice
removal.44 The last clause of this paragraph states that when the occurrence
allows for removal based on diversity jurisdiction, the case "may not be
removed" more than one year after the beginning of the suit.
45
The issue in this Note is whether the language may not be removed
46
allows for an equitable exception to the one-year time limit. The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that the meaning of the words in a statute derives from the
common usage of those words as well as from the context in which the
legislature has used them. 7 In stating that the removal notice "shall be filed"
no more than thirty days after the initial pleading,48 the first paragraph of
§ 1446(b) 49 uses "obligatory" language. 50 This language operates to limit the
that an original ad damnum of $49,999 prevented removal at the onset of the suit).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (allowing federal jurisdiction of cases arising under
federal law); id. § 1332 (allowing federal jurisdiction of state law cases in which the parties are
diverse and the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000).
42. See id. § 1441 (allowing removal of only those cases over which the federal system
would have had original jurisdiction).
43. See, e.g., Tedford, 327 F.3d at 425 (discussing the sequence of events that rendered
the case removable when the state court severed the cases, then rendered the case unremovable
when the plaintiffjoined another nondiverse defendant).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) ("[A] notice of removal may be filed within thirty
days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable....").
45. See id. (stating "that a case may not be removed on the basis ofjurisdiction conferred
by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action").
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991) (stating that "statutory
language must always be read in its proper context. 'In ascertaining the plain meaning of [a]
statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole."').
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (placing a thirty-day time limit on the availability of
removal if the case was removable at the onset of the suit, as determined by the complaint).
49. Id.
50. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1232 (3d Coll. ed. 1988) (defining "shall"
as "used in the second or third person, esp. in formal speech or writing, to express
1322
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availability of removal by placing a time constraint on when a litigant may
notice removal. 51 Then, in the second paragraph, Congress keeps the option of
removal open to litigants if the case was not initially qualified for federal
jurisdiction.52 Congress states that if the case was not initially removable but
later becomes removable, a removal notice "may be filed" within thirty days of
first learning of the presence of federal jurisdiction.53
Congress did not use "shall" in the second paragraph, and instead opted
for "may. 54 May has a permissive connotation,55 whereas shall connotes
mandatory language. Yet, in the first paragraph Congress clearly did not intend
that the defendant must remove the case if federal jurisdiction is available.
6
Removal is optional. 7 Thus, the use of the word shall in the first paragraph
does not imply an absolutely mandatory action.58 In other words, the first
paragraph of § 1446(b) could begin, "If the defendant wishes to remove" and
then continue with the current language of the first paragraph. In any case,
Congress's usage of shall does not have as much of a mandatory implication as
it may seem, thus casting a shadow of ambiguity over the entire statute.
The next question is whether Congress's usage of the language "may not"
forbids any form of exception. As stated above, may tends to imply a
permissive act. As a matter of pure language and vocabulary, whether may not
has the same permissive nature is debatable. 59 Arguably, may not is
determination, compulsion, obligation, or necessity").
51. See, e.g., Dahiya v. Talmidge Int'l, Ltd., 371 F.3d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
that the thirty-day time limit in the first paragraph of § 1446(b) usually prevents removal more
than thirty days after initial notice of the suit).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (allowing removal to occur more than thirty days after
the beginning of the suit if the case was not initially removable).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 837 (3d Coll. ed. 1988) (defining "may" as
"used to express ability or power.., used to express permission").
56. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(a) (2000) (stating that a civil action brought in state court
may be removed, not that it must be removed).
57. See, e.g., 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE 107.03 (3d ed.
2004) (discussing the option of removing from state to federal court).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
59. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTiONARY 837 (3d Coll. ed. 1988) (defining may as
"used to express permission," but in the legal sense defining the word to mean "shall; must").
Compare Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(holding that the plain language of the statute does not allow for an equitable exception to the
one-year time limit) with Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 601-03
(N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that the statute does not prohibit courts from applying equitable
considerations to the enforcement of the one-year time limits).
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ambiguous; therefore, the next focus Will be on legislative history and
congressional intent to determine whether the statute allows for an equitable
exception.
A discussion of the statute that provides for diversity jurisdiction should
precede an analysis of the history of the removal statute.6° The one-year time
limit deals only with removal based on diversity jurisdiction. 61 The issue in
Tedford is the right of removal after a year has passed.62 For this question even
to be an issue, however, diversity jurisdiction must exist. 63 Thus, a full
understanding of the one-year time limit requires an understanding of the text
and history of the diversity statute.
The diversity statute deals with controversies grounded in a state-law
cause of action between parties from different states or countries. 64 Congress
has placed parameters on the constitutionally-based original diversity
jurisdiction by setting an amount in controversy minimum and by defining the
process for determining citizenship.65 The language of the statute is relatively
clear and, in any case, is of no real consequence to this Note. Rather, the more
interesting facet of the diversity statute is its evolution and history as it relates
to removal.66
B. Statutory Histories
As stated above, the issue of the one-year time limit necessarily depends
on diversityjurisdiction. Thus, the evolution of the removal statute depends, in
part, upon the evolution of the diversity statute.67 In other words, the way
various courts have construed congressional intent regarding diversity and
removal, as well as congressional reaction to those judicial constructions, has
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (setting forth the requirements of diversityjurisdiction).
61. See id. § 1446(b) (restricting the one-year time limit for removal to cases in which
federal jurisdiction is based on diversity jurisdiction).
62. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2003) (deciding
whether to allow defendant to remove on the basis of diversity jurisdiction more than one year
after the commencement of the action).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (making the presence of diversity jurisdiction a
precondition of the operation of the one-year time limit).
64. See id. § 1332(a) (granting original jurisdiction to the federal courts "of all civil
actions" when the monetary and citizenship requirements are met).
65. See id. § 1332 (setting forth the mechanics of diversity jurisdiction).
66. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 613 (stating that the histories of the removal statute and
the diversity statute are inseparable).
67. Id.
1324
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greatly influenced the present issue of whether courts should allow equitable
principles to play a role in the one-year time limit.
68
1. The Early Stages of Removal
Diversity jurisdiction is a result of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, that defines the power of the federal judiciary as including
controversies between citizens of different states, as well as other enumerated
classes of cases.69  The Framers included diversity jurisdiction in the
Constitution because of a fear of local bias in the state courts against out-of-
state litigants.70 The Framers did not, however, designate which federal court
would exercise this jurisdiction or how the case would reach federal court.7'
Thus, almost immediately after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to create both a federal court system and the
procedures to be used in those courts.72
The 1789 Act defined original diversity jurisdiction as a case in which
more than $500 was in dispute, the parties were diverse, and at least one of the
parties resided in the forum state.73 The Act also provided the option of
removal in the instance of a plaintiff bringing suit in state court if the suit met
the requirements of diversity.74 This option existed only for defendants sued in
the state courts of the plaintiff's residence. 75 The courts viewed this procedural
68. See id. at 612-34 (putting forth the chronological histories, both legislative and
judicial, of the removal and diversity statutes). A large part of the following historical section
comes from Mr. Haiber's thorough and comprehensive treatment of removal. Though this Note
eventually draws an opposite conclusion than Mr. Haiber's Article, his research into the
histories of the two statutes is extremely informative and well organized.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the outer limits of the federal judicial power).
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1966) (arguing in favor of federal jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states in
order to avoid state court bias); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 483-500 (1927) (describing the debates during the
ratification process that led to the presence of diversity jurisdiction in the Constitution).
71. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that Congress has the power to determine which
lower courts, if any, will have jurisdiction to hear the cases and controversies in § 2).
72. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (setting forth the original congressional
establishment of the judicial system and grant of jurisdiction).
73. See id., ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78 (setting forth the requirements for original diversity-
based jurisdiction in federal courts).
74. See id., ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. at 79 (allowing for removal if the requirements of§ 1 are
present).
75. See id. ("[T]he defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such state
court, file a petition for the removal .... ).
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device as a way to ensure equal access to diversity jurisdiction between
plaintiffs and defendants.76 For quite a long while after the passage of the 1789
Act, the courts were sympathetic toward removal."
The Union victory in the Civil War brought about several congressional
acts that expanded federal jurisdiction, and many of these acts related to
removal.78 The most extensive of these acts was the Removal Act of 1875. 7 9
The 1875 Act gave original and removal federal question jurisdiction to the
federal courts. 80 The Act also amended the removal statute to allow plaintiffs,
as well as defendants, to remove 81 and to provide appellate review of orders to
remand.82 The courts continued to look favorably upon removal, considering it
a proper method for invoking federal jurisdiction.83 This favorable view of
removal and federal jurisdiction in general, combined with the creation of
federal question jurisdiction, increased federal legislation, and a rise in
interstate mobility, led to a dramatic increase in the federal caseload.
8 4
2. Removal's Retreat
Congress quickly reacted to this increase in federal litigation with the
Judiciary Act of 1887.85 The 1887 Act took the right of removal away from all
76. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 348 (1816) (describing
the removal option as a device to allow equal access to the federal forum for plaintiffs and
defendants); see also Haiber, supra note 12, at 618 (discussing Justice Story's opinion in Martin
and the subsequent adoption of this sentiment throughout the judiciary).
77. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 618-19 (stating that the courts viewed removal as a
necessary means of attaining the constitutional end of federal jurisdiction for close to a century
after the 1789 Act).
78. See id. at 620-21 (detailing the post-Civil War increase in congressional expansion of
federal jurisdiction).
79. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 470-73 (determining the jurisdiction
of the circuit courts and revising the procedure for removal from state courts).
80. See id., ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. at 470 (granting original jurisdiction to the circuit courts
of cases arising under the Constitution or United States law and of controversies between
citizens of different states).
81. See id., ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. at 471 ("[E]ither party may remove said suit into the
circuit court of the United States.").
82. See id., ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. at 472 (allowing review by the Supreme Court of any
order remanding a case to state court).
83. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 621 (asserting that the courts continued to view removal
as a necessary and favored means of exercising valid federal jurisdiction).
84. See id. at 622 (stating that these factors led to a dramatic increase in the federal
docket).
85. See Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373,24 Stat. 552 (beginning with the preamble "An act
to amend the act of Congress approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy five . ").
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plaintiffs, as well asdefendants residing in the forum state.8 6 The Act also set
the amount in controversy for all federal cases, federal question and diversity, at
$2,000.87 The result of this Act was ajurisdictional landscape more restrictive
than that provided for in the 1875 Act.88 On the other hand, the breadth of
federal jurisdiction was still greater than it was under the 1789 Act because of
the advent of federal question jurisdiction.89
Starting close to the passage of the 1887 Act, and for some time thereafter,
a split arose as to the correct way to construe the removal provisions.90 One
side of the split approached removal with a skeptical eye, opting in favor of
remand ifjurisdiction was doubtful.9' Observing the administrative burden of
the ever-increasing federal caseload, these courts sent cases back to state court
if the removal requirements were not clearly present.92 One court explained the
86. See id., ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. at 553 (stating that cases in state court "may be removed
into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defendants
therein being non-residents of that state").
87. See id., ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. at 552 (allowing original federal jurisdiction of cases
arising under federal law or controversies between citizens of different states when the amount
in controversy is greater than $2,000).
88. Compare Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470,470-73 (allowing plaintiffs and
resident defendants to remove) with Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552-55
(restricting removal to nonresident defendants and raising the amount in controversy
requirement to $2,000).
89. Compare Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552-55 (allowing original
jurisdiction of both diversity and federal question cases) with Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (allowing original federal jurisdiction in the lower federal courts of only
controversies satisfying the diversity requirements). But see Mark R. Killenbeck, In(re)
Dignity: The New Federalism in Perspective, 57 ARK. L. REv. 1,21-22 (2004) (arguing that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for federal question jurisdiction throughout the Act rather than
in a single statement).
90. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 626-29 (explaining the development of the
disagreement within the judiciary about whether the 1887 revisions to the jurisdiction and
removal provisions implied a congressional disfavor of removal).
91. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 45 F. 812, 819-20 (D. Neb. 1891) ("It is
urged by counsel for the defendant that if it is doubtful whether the cause is removable, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the jurisdiction of this [federal] court. But the converse is
the rule.").
92. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 201 F. 932, 945
(E.D. Tenn. 1912) (explaining the reasons for remanding the case). The court reasoned that
remand was proper by stating:
I am strengthened in this conclusion by the well-settled rule, growing in part out of
the great practical hardship of protracted and fruitless litigation resulting to litigants
from a ruling by a Federal trial court erroneously retaining jurisdiction of a
removed cause.., that if there be any substantial doubt as to Federal jurisdiction
the cause should be remanded, and jurisdiction retained only where it is clear.
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rationale by stating, "[i]t is the safer and wiser course to send a cause for trial to
a court of unquestionable jurisdiction, rather than retain it [in federal court],
and go through all the forms of trial when the jurisdiction is doubtful. 9 3 These
courts reasoned that because jurisdiction over diversity cases was definitely
proper in state court as the underlying substantive law was state law, expending
finite judicial resources on cases in which federal jurisdiction was clearly
proper rather than on those in which jurisdiction was questionable was the
wiser option.
94
The other side of the split based its rationale on the fact that federal
jurisdiction is a privilege granted by the Constitution. 95 Article III allows for
both federal question and diversity jurisdiction,96 and Congress had
implemented rules and procedures for exercising this jurisdiction.97 These
courts reasoned that the mere aims of efficiency and administrative ease may
not justify ignoring a constitutional and congressional grant of jurisdiction.98
Thus, these courts concluded that the presumption in favor of remand is not
well-founded and is, in effect, a denial of a constitutional right of the party
seeking the federal forum.99
In 1941, the Supreme Court addressed the split in Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets. 1° The Court reviewed the history of the removal statute and
93. Fitzgerald, 45 F. at 821.
94. See id. (making an efficiency-based argument when ordering remand to state court of
a case in which federal jurisdiction was not completely clear).
95. See, e.g., Boatmen's Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650,654-55 (8th Cir. 1905)
(rejecting the sentiment against removal, in part, because access to the federal forum is a
constitutionally-prescribed right).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the outer limits of the federal judicial power).
97. See Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552-55 (providing for original
federal question and diversity jurisdiction, and for removal of causes from state to federal court).
98. See, e.g.,Boatmen's Bank, 135 F. at 653-54 (rejecting the argument that efficiency is
a sufficient reason to deny access to the federal forum and pointing out the fact that reflexive
remand may result in greater inefficiency than would allowing removal); Niccum v. N.
Assurance Co., 17 F.2d 160, 164 (D. Ind. 1927) (citing Boatmen's Bank and stating that doubt
should be resolved in favor of removal because removal is a constitutional right); Drainage Dist.
No. 19 v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 198 F. 253,264 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (citing Boatmen s Bank
to reject the argument that courts should resolve doubt in favor of remand).
99. See Boatmen's Bank, 135 F. at 654 (taking the federal judges that reflexively remand
a case to state court to task for denying their oath and duty to hear cases properly before them
and for denying a litigant her rightful appearance in the federal forum).
100. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106 (1941) (discussing
removal as set forth in the Judiciary Act of 1887). The petitioner in Shamrock Oil was the
original plaintiff in a state court suit. Id. at 103. The defendant in that suit filed a counterclaim,
which the plaintiff removed to federal court. Id. The defendant objected to the removal on the
grounds that petitioner, the original plaintiff, was not a defendant and thus not entitled to
removal. Id. The federal district court, however, agreed with petitioner that, as a result of the
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viewed the 1887 Act as clear congressional intent to return removal to its 1789
status.101 The Court also found two new policy reasons for limiting removal.' 02
The first justification was a perceived congressional aversion to expanded
federal jurisdiction beginning in 1887.103 The Court looked to congressional
acts between the 1887 Act and 1941 and found the policies of those acts to
mandate a strict construction of federal jurisdictional legislation. 1 4 Thus, the
Shamrock Oil Court reasoned that courts should strictly construe the removal
statute against federal jurisdiction. 105
The second new justification was a federalism argument suggesting that an
expansive view of federal jurisdiction impinges upon the independence and
dignity of the state courts. 0 6 The Court stated that "[d]ue regard for the rightful
independence of state governments... requires that [federal courts] confine
their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." 107 In
other words, respect for the sovereignty of the individual states counsels against
doing anything that would expand federal jurisdiction over state law issues, and
counterclaim, petitioner was a defendant entitled to removal. Id. The question on appeal in the
Supreme Court was whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1887, a counterclaim renders the
original plaintiff in an action a defendant entitled to removal. Id. at 103-04. The Court began
with a review of the various amendments that had been added to the removal statute. Id. at 104-
05. This review revealed that, from 1875 to 1887, removal was available to either party in the
suit. Id. Prior to 1875, removal was open only to "defendants," and the 1887 amendment
returned to this language. Id. at 105-06. The Court took this statutory revision, along with
others, as clear congressional intent to restrict the option of removal to the way Congress
understood removal in 1789, that only original defendants may remove. Id. at 107. In closing,
the Court made two other observations justifying its conclusion: First, that the policies behind
the successive congressional revisions of federal jurisdiction statutes require strict, narrow
construction of these statutes; and second, that "due regard" for the individual states' interests in
adjudicating controversies in their own courts requires federal courts to adhere strictly and
narrowly to congressional jurisdictional mandates. Id. at 108-09.
101. See id. at 107 (stating that the 1887 revision indicated an intent to return to the
removal practice of the 1789 Act).
102. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 630 (highlighting the two further justifications for
favoring remand as put forth by the Shamrock Oil Court).
103. See Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108 ("[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress
regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such
legislation.").
104. See id. at 108-09 (reviewing congressional action on different aspects of federal
jurisdiction and finding an intent to restrict that jurisdiction).
105. See id. (deciding that the intent to restrict federal jurisdiction required a restriction of
the option of removal).
106. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 631 (discussing the federalism argument given by the
Shamrock Oil Court). _
107. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108-09.
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thus the courts should construe the removal statute against removal. 08 An
important aspect of the Shamrock Oil Court's decision is that it does not
discuss the main issue that gave rise to the circuit split: whether the goal of
administrative efficiency can justify a presumption against removal.'0 9 Instead,
the Court recast the presumption against removal in a constitutional and
statutory light." 0 By reframing the issue, the Court effectively undercut the
argument that efficiency cannot justify denial of a constitutional and statutory
right"'. because after Shamrock Oil, the presumption against removal was itself
a creature of Congress and the Constitution.
3. Removal in the Modern Era
After Shamrock Oil, Congress began taking steps to unify and standardize
removal practice across jurisdictions. 12 This process began with the Judicial
Code of 1948, which set the time period for removal as the later of twenty days
after either the commencement of the suit or service of process. 113 Prior to this
revision, the defendant could remove at any time prior to the due date of her
responsive pleading.l14 This situation led to a lack of uniformity because the
due dates for responsive pleadings differed across jurisdictions.' 15 Congress,
citing the impracticality of a twenty-day time limit in modem litigation, 16 again
108. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 631 (discussing how the lower courts interpreted the
Shamrock Oil Court's federalism argument as being a fear that increased removal would
undermine the federal constitutional framework).
109. See id. at 630 (pointing out the lack of an efficiency rationale in the Shamrock Oil
decision).
110. See Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108-09 (grounding the presumption in federalism and
legislative history terms rather than in terms of administrative efficiency).
111. See, e.g., Boatmen's Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1905)
(rejecting the efficiency-based argument because efficiency alone cannot justify the abrogation
of a constitutional right).
112. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 632-33 (discussing congressional action after the
Shamrock Oil decision and concluding that the action was an effort to make removal practice
fair and uniform).
113. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 4,62 Stat. 869,939 (setting a firm time limit for
removal).
114. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 633 (stating the time period for removal prior to the
1948 Act (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 72 (1940))).
115. See id. (noting the differences across jurisdictions as to the due date for responsive
pleadings).
116. See S. REP. No. 89-712 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3245,3247 (blaming
the impracticability of a twenty-day time limit as the cause for the ten-day extension).
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revised the time period in 1965 by lengthening the removal window from
twenty days to thirty days." 1
7
The express ability to remove a case that was not initially removable came
about in an amendment to the removal statute in 1949.118 This revision
presented an interesting question about the viability of ajudicially-created rule
of construing the removal statute that had been present since at least 1900.119
The Supreme Court held in 1900 that a case did not become removable if the
occurrence that qualified the case for federal jurisdiction was not a voluntary
act of the plaintiff.120 In the diversity context, the holding implied that "cases
with nondiverse parties did not become removable just because a nondiverse
defendant was [involuntarily] dismissed from the case."'12' This holding
became known as the "voluntary/involuntary rule" because only a voluntary act
by the plaintiff could render a case removable. 122 The rule was in effect before
the 1949 revision of the removal statute, which expressly provided for removal
of a claim that was not initially removable.123 Thus, courts began to question
whether the voluntary/involuntary rule still applied after the 1949 revision.1
24
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this question, all of the circuits
seem to agree that the rule still applies to the current language of § 1446(b).
25
Thus, as the law currently stands, the involuntary dismissal of a nondiverse
defendant does not thereby make a case removable on diversity grounds. An
important exception to this rule is that dismissal due to fraudulent joinder is not
117. See Act of September 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-215, 79 Stat. 887 (lengthening the
time period for filing a removal notice from twenty days to thirty days).
118. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 83, 63 Stat. 89, 101 (amending § 1446(b) to
contain two separate paragraphs, the second paragraph dealing with removal of a case that was
not initially removable).
119. See Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69,71-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (highlighting the
question of whether the voluntary/involuntary rule still applied after the 1949 amendment).
120. See Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 638 (1900) (holding that a case does not
become removable when the occurrence that conferred federal jurisdiction was not a voluntary
act of the plaintiff).
121. Poulos, 959 F.2d at 71.
122. See id. at 71-72 (discussing the voluntary/involuntary rule).
123. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 83, 63 Stat. 89, 101 (amending § 1446(b) to
contain two separate paragraphs, the second paragraph dealing with removal of a case that was
not initially removable).
124. See Poulos, 959 F.2d at 71-72 (detailing the reactions of various courts to the 1949
revision with regards to the voluntary/involuntary rule).
125. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 510-11 (2004) (discussing the
voluntary/involuntary rule and citing to circuit court of appeals opinions from eight of the
circuits and district court opinions from the remaining three circuits that affirm the application
of the rule to the removal statutes).
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deemed an involuntary act, thus allowing removal after a dismissal for
fraudulent joinder. 1
26
The most significant post-Shamrock Oil revision to the removal statute
occurred in 1988,127 and this revision instituted the one-year time limit at issue
in this Note.128 The mijor revisions were the ability to disregard the citizenship
of fictitious or unnamed defendants for the removal process, 129 a relaxing of the
pleading requirements for the removal notice,' 30 and the imposition of the one-
year time limit for diversity-based removal if the case was not initially
removable.13 1 The Committee Note accompanying this revision describes the
one-year time limit as "a means of reducing the opportunity for removal after
substantial progress has been made" and as a "modest curtailment in access to
diversity jurisdiction." 132 The Committee Note also states that under § 1446(b)
before the 1988 amendment, settlement with a nondiverse defendant on the eve
of trial would allow the remaining defendants to remove on the eve of trial and
asserts that the one-year time limit will address this problem.133 Congress again
amended the removal statutes in 1991134 but did not address the one-year time
limit.
126. See Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 254 (1Ith Cir. 1988) (stating that fraudulent
joinder is a uniformly accepted exception to the voluntary/involuntary rule). Applying the
voluntary/involuntary rule to the one-year provision, a pre-one-year summary judgment or
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that results in the nondiverse defendant being
dropped from the suit would not be a voluntary act of the plaintiff. Thus, the case would not be
removable under the rule. Rather, only a showing that the plaintiff hadjoined the nondiverse
defendant fraudulently would render the case removable.
127. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016,
102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446).
128. See id. § 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 4669 (inserting the clause "except that a case may
not be removed on the basis ofjurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1
year after commencement of the action" at the end of the paragraph dealing with cases that were
not initially removable).
129. See id. § 10 16(a), 102 Stat. at 4669 (amending § 1441 to require courts to disregard
for removal purposes the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names).
130. See id. § 1016(b)(1), 102 Stat. at 4669 (amending § 1446(a) to require only a "short
and plain statement of the grounds for removal" with the notice of removal).
131. See id. § 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 4669 (amending the second paragraph of
§ 1446(b) to include a one-year time limit on removal).
132. H.R. REP. No. 100-702, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032.
133. See id. at 6032-33 (stating that the amendment addresses problems arising from a
change of parties late in the stages of the state-court process, and pointing to removability on the
eve of trial as one of those problems).
134. See Act of December 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 10, 105 Stat. 1623, 1626
(amending § 1446 to require a prompt disposition of a notice of removal petition, either by
summary approval or remand or by a prompt evidentiary hearing).
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Aside from amending the removal statutes, Congress has also amended the
diversity statute several times since the Shamrock Oil decision. Significant
changes have occurred to the amount in controversy requirement and the
citizenship requirements. Congress amended the statute in 1958 to define the
citizenship of a corporation to be any state of incorporation as well as the
corporation's principal place of business. 135  Prior to this amendment, a
corporation was only a citizen of the state or states in which it was
incorporated. 136 As a result, diversity would exist between a plaintiff injured in
the corporation's principal place of business and that corporation only if the
corporation was incorporated in another state. 137 By amending the statute,
Congress foreclosed this situation by stating that a corporation is also a citizen
of its principal place of business.' 38 Congress also amended the diversity
statute in 1988 to raise the statutory minimum to $50,000139 and again amended
the statute in 1996 to raise the amount to $75,000.140 In other words, Congress
has thrice decided since the Shamrock Oil decision that qualification for
diversity jurisdiction should be more difficult.
Many possible conclusions may arise from the foregoing history. One
scholar recently argued that the legislative and judicial histories of removal and
diversity jurisdiction lead to the conclusion that the courts should not view
removal as a disfavored option. 41 This argument is as follows: Diversity
jurisdiction comes from the Constitution and is, thus, an important part of the
federal judicial scheme. 142  Immediately after the ratification of the
135. See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (redefining the
citizenship of a corporation).
136. See Louisville, C. & C.R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497,558 (1844) (holding
that a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated).
137. See S. REP. No. 85-1830 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101-02
(describing this situation as a "fiction" that led to the "evil whereby a local institution, engaged
in a local business and... locally owned, [was] enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal
courts simply because it has obtained a corporate charter from another State").
138. See id. at 3102 (stating that the purpose of the amendment is to restrict a corporation's
ability to reach the federal forum simply because the corporation is incorporated in another
state).
139. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a),
102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (increasing the amount in controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction from $10,000 to $50,000).
140. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205(a), 110
Stat. 3847, 3850 (raising the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction from
$50,000 to $75,000).
141. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 655 (calling current removal practice "unfair, unseemly,
and inefficient").
142. See id. at 613-16 (highlighting the preratification debate over the jurisdiction of the
judiciary and pointing out the importance of diversity jurisdiction in the final constitutional
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Constitution, the first Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 and expressly
provided for removal.143 Contemporary court decisions viewed removal as a
necessary and acceptable mechanism for ensuring equal access to the federal
forum. 44 Subsequent legislation expanded access to removal and to original
federal jurisdiction, and the courts continued to view removal favorably. 145
Legislative restriction of access to removal did not occur until the 1887 Act. 1
46
Moreover, not until after this restriction did some courts begin to view removal
unfavorably. 147 The Shamrock Oil Court set the stage for disfavoring removal
and the lower courts took the Court's decision to its most extreme
application. 148 Since the Shamrock Oil decision, Congress has amended the
removal statute to make the procedure fair and efficient and has placed a
substantive restriction on removal only once.149 Thus, the argument goes that
the current presumption against removal is not the product of any clear
congressional intent to limit the availability of removal. °50 Rather, the
presumption and disfavor are the result of the judiciary overreacting to the 1887
revision and the Shamrock Oil decision. 151 As a consequence, the courts should
drop the presumption against removal and instead view removal as a necessary
compromise).
143. See id. at 617-18 (discussing the timing and importance of the 1789 Act as it related
to the exercise of the constitutionally-prescribed federal jurisdiction).
144. See id. at 620 ("'The period between the ratification of the Constitution and the end of
the Civil War thus established removal as a simple procedural mechanism that allowed all
citizens equal access to the federal judiciary.").
145. See id. at 621-22 (describing the expansion of original jurisdiction in the 1875 Act
and the judicial response to that expansion as evidence that the original and historic
understanding of removal was very favorable).
146. See id. at 623-24 (explaining the 1887 revision of the removal provisions but
asserting that the revision simply aimed to return removal to its status after the 1789 Act).
147. See id. at 627-28 (describing the emerging sentiment against removal as "subtle yet
radical" and stating that many federal judges began to view removal as a "procedural anomaly"
that should be subjugated to the plaintiff's right to select the forum).
148. See id. at 631-32 (arguing that the lower federal courts overreacted to the Shamrock
Oil decision by creating new obstacles to removal).
149. See id. at 633-34 (describing the 1948, 1965, and 1988 revisions as being efforts at
making removal practice fair rather than an effort to restrict removal).
150. See id. at 634 ("There is no evidence that Congress intended to restrict opportunities
for removal by creating procedural landmines that would favor plaintiffs at the expense of
defendants.").
151. See id. at 655-56 (discussing the current status of removal law and stating, "[t]he
aforementioned obstacles do not... result from laws enacted by Congress; rather, they result
from judicial gloss created by the application of presumptions against removal to statutory
language").
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tool for equal footing in the federal forum, and the Tedford decision is a large
step in the right direction.'
52
Another plausible conclusion would be that congressional action after
the Shamrock Oil decision does nothing to indicate that the judicial
impression of removal is incorrect. That removal and diversity jurisdiction
enjoyed favorable status for the first century of the nation's existence seems
beyond question. 53 Moreover, the 1887 revisions154 were unquestionably a
congressional reaction to an overburdened federal judiciary. 55 Thus, the
contention with the previous conclusion begins at whether the Court's
decision in Shamrock Oil was correct.' 56 The specific holding of Shamrock
Oil seems to be the correct answer to the question presented.1 57 Arguably,'58
however, the Court went too far in the dicta about congressional disfavor of
removal and diversity jurisdiction and the primacy of federalism interests.' 59
Moreover, the lower federal courts were possibly too zealous in their
implementation of the Shamrock Oil dicta and the reflexive recitation of the
remand presumption went beyond the aims of Congress in the 1887
revisions. 60  The fact remains, however, that the Supreme Court decided
Shamrock Oil in 194 1,161 and courts have been reacting to that decision ever
152. See id. at 664 ("The single most important step the courts could take to prevent
procedural manipulation would be to follow Tedford and allow equitable exceptions when
necessary.").
153. See id. at 616-23 (putting forth a persuasive description of congressional and judicial
treatment of removal between The Judiciary Act of 1789 and The Judiciary Act of 1887).
154. See Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552-55 (restricting removal to
nonresident defendants and raising the amount in controversy requirement to $2,000).
155. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 622-23 (detailing the negative judicial and scholarly
reaction to the sharp increase in federal litigation caused by the 1875 expansion of federal
jurisdiction).
156. See id. at 630-31 (analyzing the Shamrock Oil decision and criticizing it for going
further than it needed to go yet still leaving too many questions unanswered).
157. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1941) (stating that
the 1887 amendment acted to return removal practice to its status before 1875, and that removal
thus was open only to original defendants in an action and not to plaintiffs made defendants by a
counterclaim).
158. See Haiber, supra note 12, at 630-32 (arguing that the Court went too far in the
Shamrock Oil dicta).
159. See Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108-09 (justifying the holding of the Court with the
policy arguments that Congress, in general, disfavors federal jurisdiction and that respect for
state sovereignty requires that all questionable cases be remanded to their proper place in state
court).
160. See Haiber, supra note 12, 631-32 (arguing that the lower federal courts "ignored"
Shamrock Oil's direction to simply return removal to its position prior to the 1875 amendment).
161. Shamrock Oil& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
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since.162 The disfavor of removal has been present for more than sixty years.
Thus, if Congress disagreed with this interpretation by the judiciary, all it had
to do was react accordingly.
In fact, Congress has made three substantial revisions of the removal
provisions since the Shamrock Oil decision. 163 None of these revisions have
addressed the judicial preference for remand in cases when jurisdiction is not
clear. Rather, one of these revisions placed the time limit at issue in this
Note into the statute. 164 Congress acknowledged that this time limit would
result in decreased access to the federal forum and that the time limit would
prevent removal after a year if the plaintiff settled with a nondiverse
defendant. 16  Moreover, Congress had a chance to rectify the situation in
1991 if it felt that courts were misconstruing the time limit.166 Thus, the lack
of congressional attention to the status of removal versus remand in the
federal judiciary after Shamrock Oil and its progeny demonstrates that
Congress approves of the current sentiment. In other words, the fact that the
current disfavor of removal is a product of judicial construction rather than
congressional mandate makes little difference now because the lack of
congressional clarification acts to ratify the judicial disfavor of removal. In
applying this conclusion to the one-year time limit, an expansive reading of
the statute seems to contravene the trend of congressional restriction of
removal.
162. See, e.g., Wilbur v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 480, 481-82 (M.D. Pa.
2000) (prefacing the decision whether to retain jurisdiction or remand with the assertion that
courts construe removal statutes narrowly and resolve all doubt in favor of remand).
163.. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016,
102 Stat. 4642,4669 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446); Act of September 29, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-215, 79 Stat. 887 (lengthening the time period for filing a removal notice from
twenty days to thirty days); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 4, 62 Stat. 869, 939 (setting a firm
time limit for removal).
164. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 101 6(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (inserting the clause "except that a case may not
be removed on the basis ofjurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year
after commencement of the action" at the end of the paragraph dealing with cases that were not
initially removable).
165. See H.R. REP. No. 100-702, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
6032-33 (recognizing the restrictive effect of the one-year time limit).
166. See Act of December 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 10, 105 Stat. 1623, 1626
(amending § 1446 to require a prompt disposition of a notice of removal petition, either by
summary approval or remand or by a prompt evidentiary hearing).
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III. Exemplary Judicial Treatment of the Issue
An understanding of two fundamental judicial presumptions will aid the
review of how courts have treated this issue. The first presumption is that the
plaintiff is the master of her own claim. 167 If multiple proper jurisdictions or
venues exist, the plaintiff has the right to choose the jurisdiction and venue that
she desires.168 The plaintiff may assert as many or as few claims for relief as
she thinks are proper given the situation.1
69 Similarly, the plaintiff mayjoin,
170
and in some situations must join, 17' as many defendants as the rules allow and
as she so chooses.
This presumption of plaintiff control inherently invites strategic
decisions. 172 For instance, deciding which parties to sue is an analysis of the
potential recovery from a defendant versus the cost of litigating against that
defendant. 173  Yet, even in the face of this inherent gamesmanship, the
presumption that the plaintiff is the master of her suit remains a fundamental
concept of American jurisprudence. 174
The second judicially mandated presumption is that courts should construe
the removal statute narrowly and should resolve all doubt in favor of remand.' 75
167. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (stating that the
plaintiff is the master of the complaint under the well-pleaded complaint rule).
168. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)-(b) (2000) (providing the plaintiff with various choices
of appropriate venue depending on the nature of the claim and the domicile status of the
parties).
169. See FED. R. Crv. P. 18(a) (allowing, but not requiring, any claimant to join as many
claims for relief against an opposing party as the claimant has).
170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (allowing, but not requiring, multiple parties to join in one
action as plaintiffs or any plaintiff to join in one action as many defendants as the plaintiff
desires provided that all of the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence).
171. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (requiring the joinder of any party whose presence will not
deprive the court ofjurisdiction and without which complete relief may not be granted).
172. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out the fact that the well-pleaded complaint rule allows a plaintiff to allege
only a state law claim even when an analogous federal claim exists if the plaintiff wants to avoid
the federal court system).
173. See, e.g., Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 369 F.3d 227, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2004)
(dismissing a plaintiff's claim against her employer because the workers' compensation statute
barred the plaintiff from recovery). Because the plaintiff had no chance at recovery from the
employer, the decision to proceed with the litigation proved to be a waste of resources. Id.
174. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22,25 (1913) (stating that "[o]f
course the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon"); Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (stating that the plaintiff is the master of his
complaint under the well-pleaded complaint rule).
175. See, e.g., Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, 28 F.3d 269,274 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
the congressional intent to restrict federal jurisdiction requires courts to read the removal statute
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This presumption stems from Shamrock Oil,176 when the Court stated that the
presumption against removal is a result of clear congressional intent to restrict
access to the federal courts. 17 7 As a result of Shamrock Oil, the ideas of narrow
construction and preference for remand more or less have become boilerplate in
any opinion discussing whether to remand or allow removal. 78  The
presumption is an overwhelmingly prevalent sentiment, and in fact, the Tedford
court considered the presumption before summarily dismissing it. 179 With these
presumptions in mind, the analysis proceeds next to discuss the different ways
courts have treated the issue of untimely removal in the face of forum
manipulation.
A. Equitable Exception Applies
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas provided an
introductory treatment of the issue in Ferguson v. Security Life of Denver
Insurance Co.180 The court first found that neither the plain language of the
narrowly and resolve any question against removal); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the
development of the presumption against removal).
176. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106 (1941) (discussing
removal as set forth in the Judiciary Act of 1887); see also supra note 100 and accompanying
text (providing the facts and analysis of the Shamrock Oil decision).
177. See id. at 108 ("[T]he language of the Act of 1887 evidence[s] the Congressional
purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, [and] the policy of the
successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the
strict construction of such legislation.").
178. See, e.g., Wilbur v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 480, 481-82 (M.D. Pa.
2000) (prefacing the decision whether to retain jurisdiction or remand with the assertion that
courts construe removal statutes narrowly and resolve all doubt in favor of remand); Conference
Am., Inc. v. Q.E.D. Int'l, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (same); Barber v.
Albertsons, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (same); Gramc v. Millar Elevator
Co./Schindler Enters., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1083 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (same); see also 16 JAMES
WM. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 107.05-06 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the
mandate to strictly construe the removal statutes and to resolve all doubt in favor of remand).
179. See Tedford v. Wamer-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,427 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that
Congress intended to restrict access to the federal courts through diversityjurisdiction, yet going
on to decide that this intent of restriction did not extend to cases where gamesmanship was
present).
180. See Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 603-04 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (holding that, although the one-year time limit is subject to an equitable exception, the
defendants did not prove fraudulent joinder and thus the exception was inapplicable to this
case). The plaintiff in Ferguson sued an insurance company for claims arising from the sale of
an insurance policy. Id. at 599. In the amended pleading, the plaintiff named the individual
salesman as a defendant, thereby destroying diversity. Id. The insurance company, arguing that
the plaintiff simplyjoined the salesman to defeat diversity, removed to federal court. Id. The
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statute nor the legislative history was dispositive of the issue. 18' Turning away
from the language and history of the statute, the court concluded that the
policies behind the time limit counseled in favor of an equitable 
exception. 82
The court then rested its conclusion on an extension of another Fifth Circuit
case that held that other time limits in § 1446(b) were subject to waiver.' 83 The
court reasoned that if one time limit in a statute is subject to an exception, so
too should the other time limits. I14
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi provided a
more technical treatment of whether an equitable exception applies to
§ 1446(b) in Morrison v. National Benefit Life Insurance Co.,185 and eventually
plaintiff replied that the amended complaint stated a claim against the salesman and the court
agreed, thus remanding the case to state court. Id. Sixteen months after the commencement of
the suit, the insurance company again sought to remove the case as a result of information
uncovered through discovery that shed some doubt on the viability of the claim against the
salesman. Id. at 600. The plaintiff argued that the one-year time limit barred removal, while the
insurance company urged the court to apply an equitable exception. Id. The court eventually
concluded that the time limit was subject to an equitable exception, but that the insurance
company had failed to uphold its end of the equitable bargain by not deposing the plaintiff until
sixteen months after the beginning of the suit. Id. at 603.
181. See id. at 601-02 (finding the legislative history to be of little help and then stating
that, although the plain language of the statute seems absolute on its face, many time limits seem
absolute but are still subject to an equitable exception).
182. See id. at 602-03 (analyzing the policies of the time limit and concluding that the
statute allowed for an equitable exception).
183. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513,516 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the thirty-day time limit in § 1446(b) was procedural rather than jurisdictional, and thus
subject to waiver).
184. See Ferguson, 996 F. Supp. at 603 ("[T]his Court is unaware of any authority that
allows a statute to be subject to one type of equitable exception but not another.").
185. See Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (S.D. Miss.
1995) (addressing whether in the face of unequivocal forum manipulation, the one-year time
limit precludes removal after a year has passed). The plaintiffs in Morrison filed separate but
identical actions in state court against an identical defendant on April 19, 1994. Id. at 946.
Both plaintiffs prefaced their complaint with a paragraph that stated regardless of anything that
may appear otherwise, the maximum amount of relief requested by each plaintiff was $49,000.
Id. at 947. The parties conducted discovery, and throughout the entire discovery process, the
plaintiffs repeatedly denied that their damages exceeded the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000.
Id. Then, on April 27, 1995, one year and seven days after filing the original complaints,
plaintiffs moved in state court to amend their complaints to request $2,000,000 per plaintiff. Id.
Defendant immediately removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
Id. Upon plaintiffs' motion to remand on the grounds that the one-year time limit precluded
removal, defendant argued first that one year had not passed and, second, that even if a year had
passed, the blatant forum manipulation should preclude the plaintiffs from taking advantage of
the one-year cap. Id. The federal court quickly dismissed the argument that one year had not
passed. Id. at 948. The court then held that the time limit was subject to an equitable exception
and denied the motion to remand. Id. at 951.
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concluded that the time limit is subject to an exception. I1 6 The plaintiffs in
Morrison began their state-court complaints with a conspicuous clause
notifying everyone of their intent to stay below the statutory amount in
controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction. 8 7 Then, one year and seven
days after the filing of the original complaint, plaintiffs moved in state court to
increase their ad damnum to $2,000,000.188 In response to defendant's
argument in federal court that this amendment showed clear forum
manipulation, plaintiffs openly admitted that they were taking advantage of the
one-year time limit. 8 9 Thus, the question before the federal court was whether,
in a case involving admitted forum manipulation, the one-year time limit still
denied a defendant access to the federal forum. 190
The district court centered its analysis on whether the time limit was
jurisdictional, and thus not subject to any waiver, or was procedural and subject
to waiver. 91 Without offering any independent analysis of the question, the
court, citing to the same Fifth Circuit case192 that the district court relied upon
186. See id. at 949-51 (holding that the time limit is procedural rather than jurisdictional
and thus subject to an equitable exception).
187. See id. at 947 (quoting the first paragraph of the plaintiffs' complaint). -The plaintiffs
began their complaint as follows:
Notwithstanding anything in this Complaint which might in any way be construed
to the contrary, the total amount demanded herein by plaintiff from the defendant,
exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed Forty Nine Thousand U.S. dollars
($49,000.00). All together, even if aggregated with those in any other case(s)
before this court with which this case could be consolidated, the claims and
demands made in this case and the other case(s), added together, would not exceed
the total sum of Forty Nine Thousand U.S. dollars ($49,000.00). If any statements
hereafter in this Complaint or elsewhere are inconsistent with the foregoing, all
such statements are hereby withdrawn and deleted, and the amount demanded is
limited to the sum of Forty Nine Thousand U.S. dollars ($49,000.00).
Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. ("In the case at bar, by initially demanding only $49,000.00 in the original
complaint, and waiting until after a year had run to request an increase of that demand, plaintiff
did no more than avail himself of his statutory rights, which he was entitled under the law to
do.").
190. See id. at 949 (addressing whether the time limit was subject to an equitable exception
when the plaintiffs' actions verged on fraud against the courts).
191. See id. (recognizing that a jurisdictional time limit would preclude any exception,
regardless of the egregious nature of the plaintiffs' actions).
192. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) ("We
have noted that the word 'procedural' in section 1447(c) refers to 'any defect that does not go to
the question of whether the case originally could have been brought in federal district court.'...
This distinction... is applicable to Section 1446(b) .... '[T]he time limitation for removal is
not jurisdictional; it is merely "modal and formal and may be waived. ""').
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in Ferguson,93 concluded that the time limit was procedural.' 94 Once the court
cleared the jurisdictional-versus-procedural hurdle, the next question was
whether blatant forum manipulation could constitute the waiver of the
procedural time limits of § 1446(b). 95 The court, aware that the Fifth Circuit
had never addressed the issue directly, pieced together two independent Fifth
Circuit cases to determine that forum manipulation could trigger a time-limit
waiver.1 96 The most important aspect of Morrison is that, at least according to
the court, forum manipulation can trigger the waiver of the procedural time
limits of § 1446(b).'
97
B. Equitable Exception Does Not Apply
In Cofer v. Horsehead Research & Development Co.,198 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that, even in the face of clear
193. See Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597, 603-04 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (holding that, although the one-year time limit is subject to an equitable exception, the
defendants did not prove fraudulent joinder and thus the exception was inapplicable to the case).
194. See Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 945, 949-50 (S.D. Miss.
1995) (stating that Fifth Circuit case law required the court to view the time limit as procedural).
195. See id. at 950 (addressing whether equitable estoppel may apply to the one-year time
limit in the face of forum manipulation).
196. See id. at 949-51 (combining the holding of Barnes, that the time limits are subject to
waiver, with dicta from Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1986)). The Brown court
enforced the thirty-day provision of§ 1446(b), but noted that "in the absence of waiver of the
time limit by the plaintiff, or some equitable reason why that limit should not be applied,
however, a defendant who does not timely assert the right to remove loses that right." Brown,
792 F.2d at 481-82. This suggestion of the possibility of equitable consideration becomes the
block upon which the Morrison court rests its holding that forum manipulation can trigger a
waiver. Morrison, 889 F. Supp. at 951.
197. See Morrison, 889 F. Supp. at 951 ("[The Barnes ruling that both time limitations
contained in section .1446 are procedural rather than jurisdictional makes the rationale of the
court in Brown applicable to the case at bar.").
198. See Cofer v. Horsehead Research & Dev. Co., 805 F. Supp. 541, 543-44 (E.D. Tenn.
1991) (analyzing the force of the one-year time limit for removal contained in § 1446(b)). The
plaintiffs in Cofer were individual landowners that filed separate nuisance claims in state court
against the same defendant in October of 1989, with each plaintiff requesting $49,999 in relief
Id. at 542. The state court consolidated the individual claims into one case with several
plaintiffs and one defendant in May or June of 1990. Id. After this consolidation, a
considerable amount of time passed and in July of 1991 the plaintiffs amended their pleadings
to request $150,000 per plaintiff in compensatory damages. Id. Soon thereafter, the defendant
noticed removal of the case to federal court on the grounds that complete diversity existed as
defined by statute. Id. The initial question for the judge in federal court was whether the
removal was proper as it occurred well beyond a year after the initial commencement of the
individual claims in state court. Id.
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forum manipulation, the plain language of § 1446(b) precludes removal after a
year has passed.' 99 The addamnum for each plaintiff was $49,999, one dollar
below the statutory requirement for diversity jurisdiction at the time the case
began.200 After a year had passed since the initial filing of the individual claims
in state court, the plaintiffs amended the ad damnum in their complaint to
request substantially greater than $50,000 per plaintiff.20' As a result, the case
met all of the requirements for diversityjurisdiction. °2 The defendant noticed
removal to the federal court, and the plaintiffs moved to remand to state court
on the grounds that more than one year had passed, thus precluding removal
under the § 1446(b) time limit.
203
The Cofer court ultimately granted the plaintiff's motion to remand.204 In
the opinion granting the motion for remand, the judge took note of the
defendant's argument that the plaintiffs had engaged in forum manipulation.20 5
The court, however, read the removal statute to be a jurisdictional mandate that
always precludes removal after a year has passed.206 According to the court, the
plain language of the statute was dispositive and the time limit was not subject
to any equitable exceptions. 2°7 The court also noted that the Supreme Court
allowed plaintiffs to request less than the jurisdictional amount in order to
prevent removal and that Congress knew of this fact when it enacted the one-
year time limit.2°8 Because Congress enacted the one-year time limit knowing
that the possibility for manipulation existed and declined to be explicit about an
199. See id. at 544 (recognizing that the one-year time limit allows for forum manipulation
but stating that the remedy, if a remedy is necessary, must come from Congress rather than an
expansive reading of the current statute).
200. Id. at 542.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 542 n.2.
203. Id. at 542.
204. Id. at 544.
205. See id. at 542-43 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446, Commentary on 1988 Revision of
§ 1446 (West 1994), in which David Siegel points out that the one-year time limit might "invite
tactical chicanery").
206. See id. at 543 ("The one year provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is jurisdictional and
must be noticed by the court sua sponte." (quoting Molden v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 754
F. Supp. 521, 523 (M.D. La. 1990))).
207. See id. at 544 ("The Court is constrained to apply the plain language of§ 1446(b) as
amended.").
208. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court allows for parties to request less than the
jurisdictional amount in order to defeat removal, even when it is obvious that more money is
recoverable (citing Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U.S. 305 (1915))).
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equitable exception, the court concluded that Congress, rather than the courts,
should amend the statute.2 °9
Like the Cofer court, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, in Caudill v. Ford Motor Co.,210 held that the one-year time limit
did not allow for equitable considerations. 211 The plaintiff in Caudill engaged
in two forms of forum manipulation by intentionally pleading an amount below
the statutory minimum for diversity jurisdiction and by joining a nondiverse
defendant for just more than one year for the sole purpose of defeating
diversity.212 As a result of these two forms of manipulation, the court squarely
addressed the issue of whether the one-year time limit was subject to an
equitable exception.213 The court addressed the Tedford214 decision along with
other district court decisions allowing an equitable exception, 215 but eventually
209. See id. The court stated:
If this has the effect of permitting a plaintiff to lie in wait with his or her amended
complaint containing an increased ad damnum, and thereby to keep diversity
litigation in a State court, the remedy, if one is warranted, must come from
Congress, which superimposed this effect on existing law permitting prayers for
damages purposefully less than the jurisdictional amount.
Id.
210. See Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1325-26 (N.D. Okla. 2003)
(addressing a situation where the plaintiffs misrepresented the amount in controversy and,
arguably, fraudulently joined a nondiverse defendant). The plaintiff, an Oklahoma citizen, sued
Ford, a noncitizen company, and Sunday, an Oklahoma citizen, in state court under products
liability and negligence claims on May 24, 2002. Id. at 1325-26. The plaintiffs requested relief
in excess of $10,000 in damages, as an Oklahoma law stated that any claim for relief greater
than $10,000 meant that damages are in excess of$ 10,000 but did not require a more specific or
realistic figure. Id. at 1325 n. 1; see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2008(A)(2) (2004) (stating that a
plaintiff may request $10,000 in her complaint and still prove and receive a higher amount).
Discovery showed that the actual damages were more than $1.2 million, and then, one year and
six days after the original complaint, the plaintiff dismissed Sunday from the suit without ever
taking discovery. Caudill, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1325-26. The defendant removed to federal court
on diversity jurisdiction grounds and the plaintiff moved the court to remand because more than
one year had passed. Id. at 1326. The defendant cited Tedford when arguing that the plaintiff's
actions were manipulative. Id. The court declined to follow the Tedford decision and held that
the one-year time limit "should be strictly interpreted and enforced." Id. at 1327.
211. See id. at 1327-28 (refusing to allow removal after a year had passed since the
beginning of the suit).
212. See id. at 1326 (stating that the plaintiff's addamnum was lower than actual damages
and that the nondiverse defendant's presence was dubious).
213. See id. ("Thus, the issue for the Court is whether the case may be removed even
though more than one year has passed since it was filed in state court.").
214. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,424 (5th Cir. 2003) (disregarding
the one-year time limit in the face of forum manipulation by the plaintiff).
215. See Caudill, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1326-27 (reviewing cases that allow equity to play a
role in the one-year time limit).
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sided with the line of authority suggesting that the one-year limit is a cap on
removal even when forum manipulation is clear.2 16 The court seemed to adhere
first to the presumption articulated in Shamrock i7 that courts should strictly
construe the plain language of the removal statute and implement a
presumption against removal.218 After recognizing this presumption, the court
focused on the defendant's failure to attempt to cure the problem before a year
had passed. 21 9 Though the opinion seems to imply that the court would never
allow removal after one year, 2 the court stated that it had even less incentive
to sympathize with the defendant when the defendant never attempted to cure
the fraudulent joinder before the year had passed.22'
C. Irreconcilable Differences in Analysis
These four cases illustrate the different arguments for and against the
equitable exception to the one-year time limit. Courts that recognize an
equitable exception to the one-year time limit focus on the perceived unfairness
and impropriety of forum manipulation. These courts try to find a way to right
the wrongs of forum manipulation. Many of these cases do not review the
language of the statute or the legislative history of the time limits in detail.2 2
216. See id. at 1327-28 (agreeing with the cases that refuse to extend the time limit for
equitable reasons).
217. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (introducing
the requirement of strict construction of the removal statute and the presumption against
removal).
218. See Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327-28 (N.D. Okla. 2003)
(recognizing the judicial mandate of strictly construing the removal statute against removal).
219. See id. at 1328 (stating that Ford could have moved for dismissal against Sunday in
state court, taken discovery to prove fraudulent joinder, or timely removed and argued
fraudulent joinder prior to the one-year mark).
220. See id. (stating that the court was constrained to follow the plain language of the
removal statute).
221. See id. ("There is no good reason for a federal court to 'create' removal jurisdiction
outside the one-year period when the issue could have been addressed before the deadline set by
Congress. Even if Ford were not successful on its fraudulent joinder argument, at least it would
have forced plaintiffs' hand and perhaps eliminated some of the gamesmanship that § 1446(b)
permits in its present form.").
222. See, e.g., Shiver v. Sprintcom, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 962, 963 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(failing to conduct an independent review of the language and history of the time limit and
instead proceeding straight into a discussion of whether the time limit is procedural or
jurisdictional).
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Instead, these courts rest their analysis on the assertion that the time limits are
procedural rather than jurisdictional and thus subject to waiver.223
On the other hand, courts refusing to apply equitable principles to the one-
year time limit focus on the language of the statute, the policies and legislative
history behind the time limit, and the fact that Congress knew of the potential
for manipulation when it enacted the time limit and did nothing to prevent
manipulation.224 These courts reason that the language of the statute makes
clear that removal may not occur after a year has passed, and that the whole
point of the time limit is to determine the final forum for a particular case
within a reasonable amount of time.225 With that understanding of the time
limit in mind, the courts then address the possibility of manipulation and come
to the conclusion that if Congress intended to allow equity to play a role in the
time limit, Congress would have so provided. 26
The most important aspect of this divergence in analysis is that most cases
dealing with the potential waiver have to do with a failure to assert a time limit
in a timely manner. 227 For example, courts have held that a failure to object to
removal in a timely manner, when the removing party has removed after one
year, will constitute a waiver of the right to object to removal.228 These cases
deal with the plaintiff's actions after the defendant notices removal rather than
the plaintiffs actions prior to removal. Morrison was the first case to state
directly that a plaintiff's actions prior to the notice of removal may be the action
necessary to trigger a waiver of the right to assert the time limits. 229 This
223. See id. (following other cases from the district courts of the Fifth Circuit in holding
that because the time limits are procedural and subject to waiver, equitable considerations could
trigger the waiver).
224. See, e.g., Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (finding that the plain language of § 1446(b), the legislative history, and the policies
behind the time limits all speak against any equitable exception to the one-year time limit, even
in the face of fraudulent joinder).
225. See id. at 725 ("Congress chose a one-year time peiod as indicating that substantial
progress had been made. Congress explicitly noted that settlement with a diversity-destroying
defendant on the eve of trial would create diversity but should nevertheless not allow removal if
the case had been commenced more than a year earlier.").
226. See id. (reasoning that Congress was aware of the possibility of misuse and forum
manipulation inherent in the one-year time limit but made the conscious decision that
predictability and judicial economy were more important than the defendant's choice of forum,
especially when the substantive law would remain the same in state and federal court).
227. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513,516 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing
plaintiff's motion to remand because the plaintiff failed to assert the procedural defect of the
removal in a timely fashion).
228. See id. (refusing to grant the remand motion because the plaintiff waited over twenty
months to object to the untimely removal).
229. See Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 945,951 (S.D. Miss. 1995)
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distinction is significant because it demonstrates the departure from the typical
understanding of the § 1446(b) time limits that led to the decision in Tedford.
230
IV. The ALl's Suggested Revision of the Removal Statutes
The Tedford opinion briefly mentioned what the court called a "solution to
this removal riddle" as propounded by the ALI.2 3 1 The court cited to a tentative
draft of the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project released in 1999.232 Since
the drafting of the Tedford opinion, the ALI published the final version of the
Revision Project.233 This proposed revision of Title 28 of the U.S. Code
focuses on three main topics-supplemental jurisdiction, venue, and
removal.234 This Part analyzes only the proposed revisions to the removal
statute and, specifically, deals only with this proposal as it relates to the policy
set forth in the Tedford opinion.
A. The Nuts and Bolts of the Revision
The relevant revisions occur in §§ 1446 and 1447.235 New § 1446 is
entitled "Procedure for removal of civil actions. '236 New § 1446(a) greatly
elaborates on the pleading requirements of the notice of removal.237 New
§ 1446(b) somewhat mirrors current § 1446(b) in that it sets forth thirty-day
time limits for noticing removal and differentiates between cases removable at
commencement and cases that are not immediately removable. 238  Most
(allowing plaintiffs' manipulative behavior prior to the notice of removal to trigger the waiver of
the procedural time limits of § 1446(b)).
230. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 425-29 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2003)
(citing Morrison and other district court opinions and eventually allowing for an equitable
exception).
231. See id. at 427 n. 10 (citing the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project).
232. See id. (quoting from the 1999 tentative draft of the Federal Judicial Code Revision
Project).
233. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CODE REviSION PROJECT (2004) (suggesting revisions of
the supplemental jurisdiction, venue, and removal statutes).
234. Id. at 2.
235. See id. at 339-43 (putting forth the suggested text of §§ 1446 and 1447).
236. Id. at 435.
237. See id. at 435-36 (setting forth the precise requirements of the removal notice in new
§ 1446(a)).
238. Compare id. at 436-37 (allowing thirty days for removal beginning from the point at
which the case is "ascertainably removable" in new § 1446(b)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000)
(providing a thirty-day window for removal in cases initially removable and a similar thirty-day
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importantly, new § 1446(b)(2), that deals with cases not immediately
removable, codifies the "voluntary/involuntary" rule and makes no mention of
any one-year time limit for diversity-based removal.239
New § 1447 is entitled "Procedure after removal generally. '240  New
§ 1447(a) sets forth the general powers of the federal district court after
removal has been noticed.241 Then, new § 1447(b), entitled "Remand in the
interest of justice," states:
If a civil action has been removed under sections 144 1(a) and 1446(b)(2) of
this chapter more than one year after the commencement of the action, and
if the sole basis for removal is the jurisdiction conferred by sections 1332
or 1367 of this title, the district court may in the interest ofjustice remand
the action to the State court from which it was removed. No such remand
shall be ordered except upon motion of a party filed within the time
permitted for a motion to remand under subsection (c)(1).
242
This subsection is an elaboration on the second paragraph of current
§ 1446(b),243 in that it deals only with cases not initially removable in which
the underlying claim is based on state law.244 Thus, if this proposed revision
governed removal, the Tedford court would have looked to this section in
deciding whether to remand or allow removal.245 At first glance, this
proposal resembles the holding of Tedford in that it allows removal to occur
more than one year after the commencement of the action.4 If the ALI's
window for cases not initially removable beginning at the time that the case becomes
removable).
239. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 437 (2004) (stating that "[t]he notice of
removal of a civil action that is not removable when commenced... shall be filed within 30
days ... from which it may first be ascertained that the action is or by voluntary act of the
plaintiff has become removable" but declining to incorporate the current one-year time limit of
§ 1446(b)) (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 463.
241. See id. (giving the district court the power to issue orders necessary for the handling
of the removal notice in new § 1447(a)).
242. Id.
243. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (discussing, in the second paragraph, the availability
of removal of cases that did not initially qualify for original federal jurisdiction).
244. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 463 (2004) (confining application of new
§ 1447(b) to actions removed under new § 1446(b)(2), which discusses cases not ascertainably
removable at the commencement of the action, and in which jurisdiction is conferred solely by
supplemental or diversity jurisdiction).
245. See Tedford v. Wamer-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,424-25 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating
facts that show that the action as originally filed did not satisfy the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction but later qualified for diversity jurisdiction).
246. Compare id. at 429 (holding that the facts of the case require an extension of the one-
year time limit) with FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 463 (2004) (allowing diversity-
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suggestion is simply a codification of the Tedford ruling, or if the Tedford
ruling is nothing more than a judicial adoption of the ALI's suggestion, the
analysis of the ALl suggestion would be the same as the analysis applied in
Tedford. A comparison of the Tedford holding and the ALI proposal,
however, shows that the two procedural mechanisms differ materially. Thus,
a description of the procedure implied by the Tedford opinion will aid a
comparison of the Tedford analysis to the workings of the ALl proposal.
The core implication of the Tedford decision is that courts in the Fifth
Circuit may disregard the one-year bar against removal currently found in
§ 1446(b) when the plaintiff has engaged in forum manipulation. 247 This
escape device is a judicially created exception to a congressionally enacted
248statute. For courts in the Fifth Circuit, the starting point in analyzing the
hypothetical case set forth in Part I of this Note would be the statute. 249 After
determining that the correct provision for the case would be the second
paragraph of § 1446(b),250 the court then would determine whether the
defendant was attempting to remove more than one year after the
commencement of the action.25' If the answer to this inquiry was "yes," only
then would the court determine whether the case resembled Tedford closely
enough to disregard the congressional mandate to remand if more than one
year has passed.252 This situation, in which a judicially created exception
applies to a congressional mandate, necessarily implies a presumption in
favor of applying the statutory directive to remand. In other words, the court
would have to clear a high hurdle to justifiably apply an equitable exception
under the Tedford framework.
based removal to occur more than one year after the commencement of the action in new
§ 1447(b)).
247. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 428-29 (stating that a district court may use its equitable
powers to extend the one-year time limit in § 1446(b) when the plaintiff has engaged in
manipulative conduct).
248. See id. (creating an exception to § 1446(b)).
249. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1448 (2000) (goveming the removal of a case from state court
to federal court).
250. See id. § 1446(b) (dealing in the second paragraph with cases that have only become
removable at some point after the commencement of the action).
251. See id. (requiring remand if removal is occurring more than one year after the
commencement of the action).
252. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,428-29 (5th Cir. 2003) (creating
an exception to the one-year time limit rather than attempting to completely supersede it).
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B. How the Revision Works
The ALI suggestion, although obviously aimed at the same practices that
the Tedford court found objectionable,253 operates differently than does the
Tedford mechanism. The ALI suggestion, if enacted, would render the Tedford
exception moot. Thus, no judicially created exception exists under the ALI
framework. Instead, the statute itself purports to control the whole situation. 4
Applying the ALI revision to the hypothetical discussed in Part I, a court
governed by the ALI statute would still have to make preliminary
determinations before looking to the ALI's proposed § 1447(b). First, the
federal court would have to determine that the defendant was trying to remove a
case that was not initially removable but that had become removable sometime
after the commencement of the suit.2 55 Second, the court would have to find
that the defendant was trying to remove more than one year after the
commencement of the action. 6 Finally, the court would have to find that the
defendant was removing a case based on a state-law claim to federal court.
2 57
New § 1447(b) would begin to control only after the court made these
preliminary findings. 8
Apart from these judicial findings of fact, new § 1447(b) would also need
an affirmative act on the part of the plaintiff before the statute began to
control. 259 The plaintiff would have to move the court within thirty days of
removal to remand the case back to state court.260 This requirement would
253. Compare id. (providing the equitable exception to negate plaintiff's manipulative
behavior) with FED. JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECT 466-67 (2004) (replacing the one-year
time limit with new § 1447(b) because the time limit is "easily abused").
254. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REvIsION PROJECT 463 (2004) (handling, in new § 1447(b),
cases that were not initially removable and in which a party is seeking to remove more than one
year after the commencement of the action, which is the only scenario to which Tedford could
apply).
255. See id. ("If a civil action has been removed under sections 1441(a) [qualifies for
federal jurisdiction] and 1446(b)(2) [was not ascertainably removable at the commencement of
the action] .....
256. See id. ("If a civil action has been removed.., more than one year after the
commencement of the action.... ").
257. See id. ("[A]nd if the sole basis for removal is the jurisdiction conferred by sections
1332 [diversity] or 1367 [supplemental jurisdiction] of this title .... ").
258. See id. (preconditioning operation of new § 1447(b) on the presence of the three
requisite factors).
259. See id. ("No such remand shall be ordered except upon motion of a party filed within
the time permitted.. .
260. See id. (referencing the time limits in new § 1447(c)(1)).
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settle the debate over whether the time limit was jurisdictional or procedural.26'
If new § 1447(b) was jurisdictional, the court would be bound to invoke the
statute sua sponte if it found that removal was occurring more than one year
after commencement of the action and justice required remand.262 This duty
exists because jurisdictional requirements operate throughout the entire course
263Onteohrhnbof litigation and may be asserted by any actor. On the other hand, by
requiring a motion from the party seeking remand, the ALI necessarily makes
the workings of new § 1447(b) procedural. 2 4
If the plaintiff timely moves the court, remand would be neither automatic
nor even presumptive. Rather, new § 1447(b) requires the court to remand only
if remand would be "in the interest of justice., 265 Far from the statutorily
mandated presumption in favor of remand under the Tedford mechanism, the
ALl revision seems to favor retention ofjurisdiction by the federal court.266 In
effect, the court must remand only if the plaintiff timely moves for remand and
justice requires such remand.267 Otherwise, new § 1447(b) seems to view
removal more than one year after commencement of the action as an
acceptable, and perhaps even preferred, option.268 This view is a sharp
departure from the current congressional stance on removal more than one year
after commencement of the action.269
261. Compare Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,426 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the one-year time limit is procedural and thus subject to waiver) with Price v. Messer, 872
F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (viewing the one-year time limit as jurisdictional in
nature).
262. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998) (noting
that a court cannot proceed if it lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the case whenever
jurisdiction is deemed defective).
263. Id.
264. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECT 463 (2004) (requiring a motion by a party
to invoke the workings of new § 1447(b)). Arguably, this issue is moot as new § 1447(b) does
away with a strict time limit, and, thus, the new statute eliminates the need to discuss whether
the one-year aspect of new § 1447(b) is procedural or jurisdictional in nature. The fact remains,
however, that if new § 1447(b) did not contain the last sentence requiring a motion by a party, a
court could construe the statute as being jurisdictional in nature. In that case, the court would
be bound to remand if it found that the interest ofjustice required remand, regardless of what
the parties said or did. Thus, this requirement of a motion is very important in constricting a
court's power, and is not moot.
265. Id.
266. See id. (stating that the district court may remand in the interest of justice, thus
implying that the court should otherwise retain jurisdiction).
267. Id.
268. See id. (stating that the court may remand but giving no indication that the court
should remand).
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (stating that a case may not be removed more than
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C. Questions and Answers About the Revision
Obviously, the ALI removal revision is only a scholarly suggestion at this
point. The proposal presents as many questions as it does answers because no
case law on the matter exists. The ALI responds to some of the most obvious
questions after it puts forth the language of the proposed statute.270 The biggest
question is clearly how to quantify the interest ofjustice. In other words, what
factor or set of factors tips the scale of justice in favor of remand? The ALl
points to the judicial construction of the interest ofjustice clauses contained in
§§ 1404 and 1406 as useful guidance. 271 This suggestion presents a few
problems. First, the courts struggle to find a uniform interpretation and
application of the interest ofjustice language in the current statutes.2 72 As the
ALl admits, this standard is inherently discretionary,273 so one court's justified
remand could be another court's clear case for retaining jurisdiction.
The other large problem with pointing to existing statutes as guidance for
applying the interest ofjustice standard is that the subject matter of the current
statutes differs from the subject matter of the ALl proposal.274 The current
one year after the commencement of the action).
270. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 465-71 (explaining the effect and
implementation of the revision and offering illustrations).
271. See id at 467 ("Cases construing the 'interest ofjustice' standard under... § 1404
and § 1406 will provide some guidance to the district court in the exercise of its discretion.");
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought."); id. § 1406(a) (concerning cases in which venue is
improper and giving the district court the option to dismiss or, in the interest ofjustice, transfer
the case to a proper venue).
272. See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests ofJustice, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 443,446 (1990) (describing the current state of the law regarding the interest of
justice standard as being "in chaos" and preventing any prediction on how a court will decide a
given motion to transfer). Professor Steinberg's Article provides a detailed analysis of the cases
dealing with the interest ofjustice standard. The Article concludes that the standard has little or
no effect on the decision whether to transfer venue and that the interest of justice transfer
motion has become nothing more than a tool for delay. Id. at 447. Compare Campbell v.
Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1225, 1226-27 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (stating that a
transfer in the interest ofjustice should not be liberally granted) with Exps. Refinance Corp. v.
Marden, 356 F. Supp. 859, 860 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (stating that the language of§ 1404(a) should
be liberally construed).
273. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 468 (2004) (recognizing the discretionary
nature of the interest of justice remand decision).
274. But see Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4
(amending the diversity statute to contain a section dealing with federal jurisdiction of class
actions and allowing the federal court to decline jurisdiction in various circumstances "in the
interest of justice"). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 splits potential class actions into
three categories-those in which less than one third of class members are nondiverse as to the
1351
62 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1315 (2005)
statutes, §§ 1404 and 1406, deal with venue, and, specifically, whether to
transfer venue or whether to dismiss a case if venue is improper.275 These
inquiries seem to concentrate on fairness to the parties involved.276 Moreover,
these inquiries presuppose federal jurisdiction.2" In other words, the question
in these current statutes is not whether to retain jurisdiction or remand to state
court, but rather which federal court should hear the case.278
On the other hand, the AL interest of justice question arises in the
removal context.279 The ALl statute hinges the decision whether to remand or
retain jurisdiction on whether remand would be in the interest ofjustice.280 The
obvious question is, justice as to whom? Should the courts look to the litigants
involved in the instant case and make a decision based only on their
interests? 281 Another plausible reading of the statute, especially given the
judicial history of removal,282 would allow a court to decide whether to remand
based on the interests of the parties as well as of the states and the federal
system. In other words, the courts could decide that retention ofjurisdiction in
the federal system in a given case would deprive the state court of a chance to
primary defendant, those in which between one third and two thirds of the class members are
nondiverse as to the primary defendant, and those in which more than two thirds of the class
members are nondiverse as to the primary defendant. Id. In the second category, those class
actions in which between one and two thirds of the class members are nondiverse as to the
primary defendant, Congress has allowed the federal court to decline jurisdiction in the interest
ofjustice according to a list of factors. Id. This interest ofjustice inquiry may be more helpful
than the venue statutes in construing the ALI revision because, similar to the ALI revision, the
Class Action Fairness Act deals with the question of whether to retain jurisdiction or to remand
to the state courts. Notably, many of the listed factors that courts should consider in making the
decision to retain or decline jurisdiction of a class action pertain to matters of administrative
efficiency and federalism. Id.
275. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) (discussing the proper situations in which to transfer
venue); id. § 1406(a) (defining the options of a court in a case where venue in that court is
improper).
276. See, e.g., id. § 1404(a) ("For the convenience ofparties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer .... ") (emphasis added).
277. See id. (allowing transfer only to any other district where the case might have been
brought originally).
278. See id. (discussing only transfer from one federal court to another federal court); id.
§ 1406(a) (discussing only whether to dismiss a case completely or transfer to another federal
court).
279. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REvIsION PROJECT 463 (2004) (allowing remand in the
interest ofjustice in new § 1447(b)).
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000) (basing the decision whether to transfer in the
interest ofjustice on the convenience of the parties and witnesses).
282. See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of the removal statute and highlighting the
deference paid to the sovereignty of the states).
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handle an important state law issue and, thus, remand based on that interest of
justice. Because the current statutes deal with venue and the ALI revision deals
with removal,283 the interest of justice inquiry will vary across these different
subject matters. Thus, the judicial construction of the venue statutes will be of
little help in advancing justice in the removal arena.
The ALl responds to the possibility that courts will use this grant of broad
discretionary power as a way to clear a heavy docket by pointing to three
factors that limit this discretion. 284 The ALI first argues that new § 1447(b)
applies only to that group of cases in which removal is currently prohibited.285
Thus, courts cannot use this interest of justice discretion to remand a case
unless it meets the very narrow preliminary conditions of new § 1447(b).286
The ALI next points out that remand would be possible only if a party made a
motion to remand.287 Thus, the courts cannot simply invoke the interest of
justice discretion sua sponte as a way to dispose of unwanted cases.288 Finally,
the ALl further argues that the remand motion must occur within the strict
thirty-day window allowed for remand based on procedural grounds. 289 As a
result of this limited amount of time, a court cannot exercise its discretion at
some future point in time beyond thirty days just to clear the docket.
290
One question that the ALI does not address is how the obligation to strictly
construe the removal statutes and to resolve all doubt in favor of remand would
factor into the implementation of new § 1447(b).291 As stated above, new
283. Compare 28 U.S.C §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (2000) (setting forth the rules of transfer of
venue) with FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 463 (2004) (discussing removal of a case
more than one year after commencement of the action in new § 1447(b)).
284. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 467 (2004) (discussing three ways the
revision would act to prevent a court from abusing its discretion).
285. See id. (highlighting the small class of cases to which this provision would apply,
specifically to "those that do not become removable until a year or more since their
commencement in state court").
286. See id. at 463 (restricting, by its own terms, application of new § 1447(b) to cases that
were not ascertainably removable at the commencement of the action, were removed more than
one year after commencement, and in which jurisdiction is based solely on diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction).
287. See id. at 467 (highlighting the suggested revision's requirement of a motion for the
statute to apply).
288. See id. ("[S]ua sponte remand is not permitted.").
289. See id. (pointing out the strict time limit for the motion to remand).
290. See id. (describing the time limit as a means of preventing courts from using the
statute to clear the docket).
291. See, e.g., Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
the congressional intent to restrict federal jurisdiction requires courts to read the removal statute
narrowly and resolve any question against removal).
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§ 1447(b) seems to impose a presumption in favor of retention ofjurisdiction in
cases that fit the § 1447(b) prerequisites.292 This presumption would apply only
to cases governed by § 1447(b), leaving the previous judicial mandate to
construe the removal statutes narrowly in place for removal in general. Thus, a
court applying the narrow construction mandate to § 1447(b) could, if the court
still adhered to the Shamrock Oil principles, 293 reason that it should resolve all
doubtful cases against removal. Stated differently, a court facing a new
§ 1447(b) situation would have to apply the new statute against the backdrop of
the previous mandate to narrowly construe the removal statutes in favor of
remand. The result of this awkward juxtaposition could be a court deciding to
resolve all doubt about whether remand would be in the interest of justice, an
inherently doubt-ridden standard, in favor of remand. At the very least, this
situation would be extremely confusing and lead to a lack of uniform
implementation, and may even lead to a nullification of the principle behind the
interest of justice standard.294
A full and detailed analysis of the ALI's revisions to the removal statute is
far beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this Part seeks only to present the
revision as it relates to the equitable exception found in Tedford. On the most
basic level, the equitable exception and the ALI's new § 1447(b) both seek to
cure the same perceived problem.2 95 Both mechanisms attempt to prevent
plaintiffs from engaging in manipulative practices by greatly decreasing the
292. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVIsIoN PROJECT 463 (2004) (stating that the court may-
not must-remand in the interest of justice in new § 1447(b), thus implying that the court
should otherwise retain jurisdiction).
293. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107 (1941) (stating that
courts should narrowly construe the removal statutes in favor of remand because of a perceived
congressional intent to do so and a healthy respect for federalism).
294. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 466-67 (2004) (describing the interest of
justice standard as a flexible mechanism allowing the individual courts to make decisions based
on fairness in each individual case).
295. Compare id. (replacing the one-year time limit with new § 1447(b) because the time
limit is "easily abused") with Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,428-29 (5th Cir.
2003) (providing an equitable exception to negate plaintiffs manipulative behavior). Standing
alone, new § 1447(b) may encompass many more situations than just instances of alleged forum
manipulation. For instance, a district court could remand a case to state court in the interest of
justice due to some consideration regarding accessibility of evidence or witnesses. The state
courts are located in the individual cities and counties whereas the federal district courts are
spread sparsely throughout the state. Thus, justice might counsel in favor of remanding to the
more geographically specific state court. Such remand in the interest of justice would have
nothing to do with forum manipulation. Though the ALI commentary accompanying new
§ 1447(b) deals exclusively with the interest of justice standard as it pertains to forum
manipulation, the text of the revision may be overly broad.
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incentive in those practices.296 Though the two "solutions" operate differently,
they both give a large amount of discretion to the districtjudges. In the case of
the equitable exception, a question still exists about whether Tedford's reading
of the current statute is a permissible construction. On the other hand, a
question in common for the equitable exception and the ALl revision is
whether either of them would work in practice.
V. Post-Tedford Treatment in the Fifth Circuit
Though the concept of an equitable exception to the one-year time limit is
not new to the federal courts,297 its binding effect in the Fifth Circuit is a new
development.298 The Tedford court only recently published its decision in April
2003,299 so the lower courts of the Fifth Circuit have not had a long time to
adapt to the equitable exception's binding presence throughout the circuit.
Moreover, the ALl removal revision300 is just a suggestion, thereby making it
impossible to determine how the revision has worked in practice. Since the
Tedford decision, however, several of the district courts in the Fifth Circuit
have addressed removal occurring more than one year after commencement.3° 1
This Part analyzes those recent cases to highlight how the courts are handling
the equitable exception as put forth in Tedford, and the conclusions of this Part
do not pertain to the ALl revision.
296. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 427 (opting for an equitable application of the one-year time
limit because a strict application would invite manipulation and gamesmanship by the plaintiff);
FED. JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECT 463 (2004) (allowing remand only when remanding
would further the interest ofjustice in new § 1447(b)).
297. See, e.g., Kite v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 761 F. Supp. 597,601 (S.D.
Ind. 1989) (recognizing an equitable exception to the one-year time limit in § 1446(b) just one
year after the 1988 revision that added the time limit).
298. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 429 (recognizing the equitable exception as a valid rule of
decision in the Fifth Circuit).
299. Id.
300. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECT 463 (2004) (revising the removal
procedure to allow remand of a case removed more than one year after the commencement of
the action only if remand would be in the interest of justice).
301. See Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 422,429 (W.D. La. 2003) (granting
an equitable exception to the one-year time limit after finding that the plaintiff had joined
nondiverse defendants to defeat removal). But see Clark v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 04-1537,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14224, at *5 (E.D. La. July 23, 2004) (refusing to grant an equitable
exception to the one-year time limit because, in the court's opinion, the plaintiff's actions did
not meet the level of manipulation found in Tedford); Foster v. Landon, No. 04-2645,2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22440, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2004) (refusing to grant an equitable exception to
the one-year time limit because the plaintiff's actions were not egregiously manipulative
enough).
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A. The Few, the Proud, the Cases
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana applied an
equitable exception to the one-year time limit in Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co.302
because, in the court's opinion, the primary purpose of the presence of
nondiverse defendants was to defeat removal.30 3 At various points during the
course of litigation, several different representatives were attempting to litigate
the same class action, all with the same counsel.3°4 The plaintiffs in these
parallel actions engaged in very blatant attempts to avoid federal court.30 5
Whenever an attempt to avoid federal court failed, plaintiffs' counsel simply
dismissed that suit and proceeded with another class representative.30 6 In the
Ardoin action, plaintiffs joined several nondiverse defendants.30 7 After a year
had passed, plaintiffs began dismissing various defendants, and after several
rounds of dismissals complete diversity existed.3°8 The remaining defendants
noticed removal, thus leading to the instant decision.30 9 The plaintiffs offered
various nonmanipulative explanations as to why they had begun dismissing
defendants after a year had passed.310 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that
302. See Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29 (applying the equitable exception set forth in
Tedford). The plaintiffs in Ardoin were pursuing a class action suit against various defendants
involved with the treating and selling of lumber. Id. at 426. The court previously had denied a
notice of removal because complete diversity did not exist. Id. at 424. The defendants again
removed nine months later, and this time complete diversity was present. Id. The plaintiffs
argued that, though subject matter jurisdiction was proper, § 1446(b) barred removal. Id. The
defendants responded that the Tedford exception applied to their case. Id. The court discussed
the equitable exception argument at great length. 1d. at 425-28. After comparing the facts of
Tedford to the facts of the present case, the magistrate judge found that the plaintiffs' actions
were primarily motivated by a desire to avoid federal court. Id. at 428. Thus, the magistrate
judge recommended that the court apply an equitable exception. Id. at 429. The district judge
agreed with that recommendation and denied the motion to remand, but immediately certified
the issue for interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 423-24. The Fifth Circuit denied
the appeal. Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 885 So. 2d 43, 47 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
303. See Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (finding that, more probably than not, the plaintiff
had engaged in forum manipulation sufficient to apply the equitable exception set forth in
Tedford).
304. See id. at 426 (discussing the parallel class action claims being pursued by the same
group of plaintiffs).
305. See id. at 426-27 ("[P]laintiffs employed every known tactic and artiface [sic] to
secure remand to state court.").
306. See id. at 426 (discussing the successive dismissals of the parallel actions).
307. See id. at 427 (discussing the alignment of parties in the Ardoin action).
308. See id. (describing the timing of the dismissal of various groups of defendants).
309. See id. (stating that the remaining defendants removed when complete diversity
existed).
310. See id. (discussing the justifications given for the dismissals of the nondiverse
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discovery had revealed that the dismissed defendants were small entities. 3,'
Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the class could pursue its interests more manageably
against a smaller group of key defendants.312 After considering the various
arguments, the court rejected all of the plaintiffs' arguments as "pretext to cover
their efforts to prevent removal. 3 13 Thus, the court found that the weight of the
evidence dictated that the Tedford exception should apply and that the federal
court should retain jurisdiction.
314
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana refused to
apply the Tedford equitable exception in Clark v. Nestle USA, Inc.315 because
the evidence of forum manipulation was not as clear cut as the Tedford facts.316
The court stated that initially stipulating an amount in controversy lower than
the statutory minimum and then drastically increasing the amount more than
four years later "could reflect an effort to manipulate the forum."3 17 The court
went on to state, however, that the evidence of manipulation was not as "clear
cut" as was the pattern of manipulation in Tedford and other cases that applied
the equitable exception. 31 Moreover, the court asserted that the defendant had
defendants).
311. See id. (explaining the plaintiffs' argument that the timing of the dismissals was
merely coincidental to the strategic decision to dismiss the smaller defendants).
312. See id. (citing the plaintiffs' argument that the presence of the dismissed defendants
was unnecessary for a full recovery for the class).
313. Id. at428.
314. See id. at 428-29 (finding that the manipulative conduct of the plaintiffs warranted an
equitable exception to the one-year time limit).
315. See Clark v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 04-1537, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14224, at *5
(E.D. La. July 23, 2004) (refusing to apply the Tedford exception). The plaintiff in Clark
brought suit in state court and stipulated in her complaint that the amount in controversy was
less than the statutory minimum for federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at * 1. Four years after
commencement of the suit and three months before trial, the plaintiff sought to amend her
complaint to withdraw the stipulation. Id. The defendant objected to this motion in state court,
and the state court declined to issue a ruling until the defendant filed and resolved its removal
notice. Id. at *2. The defendant removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and the
plaintiff timely moved to remand because the one-year time limit had passed. Id. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff's actions were manipulative and that the court should equitably extend
the one-year time limit. Id. After reviewing the Tedford case and the cases that Tedford cited
favorably, the court addressed the plaintiff's actions. Id. at *3-5. The court found that, though
the plaintiff's action could have been manipulative, the evidence of manipulation was not as
clear as it was in Tedford. Id. at *5. The court also accepted plaintiffs explanation that
subsequent psychological treatment was the cause of the increase in amount in controversy. Id.
316. See id. (refusing to grant an equitable exception to the one-year time limit because, in
the court's opinion, the plaintiffs actions did not meet the level of manipulation found in
Tedford).
317. Id. at *5.
318. See id (comparing the plaintiffs actions to those of the plaintiffs in cases that allowed
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not been vigilant in seeking removal because defendant had known of the
increase for nine months before removing. 319 Thus, defendant's removal was
procedurally defective because it occurred more than thirty days after the case
had become removable. 320 Despite this separate procedural deficiency, the
court seemed to imply that it would not have granted an equitable exception to
the one-year bar on the facts of this case.32'
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
refused to apply an equitable exception to the one-year time limit in Foster v.
Landon322 because, again, the manipulative conduct was not egregious
enough.23 The court stated that plaintiff's actions had an "aroma of
manipulation," but that the operative question was "whether this aroma of
manipulation [was] sufficient to trigger the rarely used exception. 3 24 The court
responded to this question by asserting that the plaintiffs actions did not
"present the egregious, clear pattern of forum manipulation as in [Tedford]."325
The court felt that the plaintiff's actions in Tedford were blatantly manipulative
and, thus, required no speculation as to the motives behind the action.326 The
Foster facts, apparently, did require speculation as to the motives behind the
delayed sending of the settlement letter.327 As a result, the court resorted to the
the exception).
319. See id. at *5-6 (stating that the defendant had not been diligent in its effort to
remove).
320. See id. at *6 (highlighting the separate procedural deficiency of defendant's removal).
321. See id. at *5 (asserting that the plaintiff's actions did not reach the level of
manipulation necessitated by Tedford).
322. See Foster v. Landon, No. 04-2645, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22440, at *7 (E.D. La.
Nov. 4, 2004) (refusing to grant the Tedford exception). The plaintiff in Foster brought a
personal injury claim against the defendant and the rental company that owned the car that the
defendant was driving. Id. at * 1-2. The plaintiff subsequently dismissed the driver from the
suit and the remaining defendant removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at *2. The
plaintiff sought remand because the removal was occurring more than one year after the
commencement of the action. Id. at *3. The defendant responded that the court should apply an
equitable exception to the time limit. Id. The defendant pointed out that the original complaint
asserted that the amount in controversy was less than $75,000. Id. at *6. Then, a year later, the
plaintiff sent a settlement letter, with medical records attached, that showed that the actual
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Id. The court admitted that the plaintiff's actions
seemed manipulative, but said that these actions were not sufficiently manipulative to warrant a
Tedford exception. Id. at *8.
323. See id. at *8 (refusing to grant an equitable exception to the one-year time limit
because the plaintiffs actions were not egregiously manipulative enough).
324. Id. at *7.
325. Id.
326. See id. at *8 (stating that the facts of Tedford did not require any speculation as to the
motive behind the plaintiffs actions).
327. See id. ("In this case, Plaintiff may have delayed by a few months in sending a demand
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presumption requiring strict construction of the removal statute in favor of
remand and granted plaintiff's motion to remand.328
B. More Irreconcilable Differences?
The implication of these early cases is clear. The Tedford decision
requires judges to quantify somehow the egregiousness of a plaintiffs
manipulative conduct in order to resolve a Tedford question.329 These cases
show that some attempts at forum manipulation may be acceptable, but that at
some point the gamesmanship becomes too manipulative and the equitable
exception applies.330  Arguably, however, differentiation among levels of
manipulative conduct does not make sense. If the aim of the Tedford court was
to take the incentive out of manipulative conduct, 331 it cannot follow that some
manipulation is acceptable whereas other manipulation is unacceptable.
Moreover, the manipulation threshold clearly will differ from district to
district and from judge to judge. Apart from the obvious disparity in
application that will arise within the circuit, this individual differentiation will
lead to gridlock on appeal. As the Ardoin court correctly states, "the denial of
remand based on an interpretation of Tedford involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for differences of opinion."332 If an
appellate court determines that the decision to retain jurisdiction based on
letter and medical records indicating that the federal jurisdictional amount is satisfied.
However, such conduct hardly rises to the transparent attempt to circumvent federal jurisdiction
presented in Tedford.").
328. See id. (stating that the requirement to construe the removal statute against removal
tipped the scale against applying the Tedford exception).
329. See, e.g., id. at *7 (refusing to apply the equitable exception because the level of
manipulation was not as egregious as the manipulation in the cases that applied the equitable
exception).
330. Compare Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (W.D. La. 2003)
(granting an equitable exception after finding that the plaintiffs had no legitimate reason for
joining nondiverse defendants other than defeating diversity jurisdiction) with Foster v. Landon,
No. 04-2645, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22440, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2004) (refusing to grant an
equitable exception because the "aroma of manipulation" was not strong enough).
331. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,427-28 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating
that strict application of the one-year time limit would unduly reward inequitable practices by
the plaintiff).
332. Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 424; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (allowing a
district judge to certify a question for interlocutory appeal if the question is a "controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and if "an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.") This procedural device requires the permission of the district judge, and also
requires that the appellate court agree to hear the appeal. Id.
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Tedford is incorrect, a new trial in state court is the only remedy, 333 a remedy
that means the litigants have wasted substantial time and resources in a useless
federal case because jurisdiction was improper. To resolve this problem, the
Ardoin court immediately certified its decision for interlocutory appeal to the
Fifth Circuit before the trial occurred.334 Though this decision was prudent in
this specific instance, such procedure is unacceptable as a matter of policy.
If every court that retains jurisdiction based on Tedford immediately
certifies the ruling for interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit's docket could
increase significantly. This implication leads to two options. First, as the
Foster court did, a court could continue to resolve all doubt in favor of
remand,335 thus avoiding the need for interlocutory appeal and the risk of
wasting time on an improper trial. The problem with this option is that doubt
seems inherent in the decision of whether a plaintiff's actions are manipulative
enough to warrant a Tedford exception. The second option is for the Fifth
Circuit to defer to the trial judge's finding and summarily affirm in most
situations.336 This option would alleviate the administrative impracticability of
the interlocutory appeal option but would do nothing to cure the disparity in
application from court to court.
VI. Implications for the Future
This discussion highlights two questions as the courts and Congress
proceed on this issue. First is the question of whether the Tedford court's
reading of § 1446(b) is a permissible interpretation of the statute. The second,
and perhaps more important, question is whether the Tedford exception and the
ALI revision are good policy. The answer to the first question is that Tedford
probably takes too much license with the statutory language. The Tedford court
333. See, e.g., Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (1 th Cir. 1994) (remanding
and vacating the lower court's retention ofjurisdiction, thus requiring that the litigants go back
to state court).
334. See Ardoin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (staying further proceedings after deciding to
retain jurisdiction to allow plaintiff to immediately appeal the removal decision to the Fifth
Circuit).
335. See Foster v. Landon, No. 04-2645, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22440, at *8 (E.D. La.
Nov. 4, 2004) (opting to follow the presumption in favor of remand instead of applying the
Tedford exception on mere speculation).
336. See, e.g., Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., 885 So. 2d 43,47 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (stating
that the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' interlocutory appeal of the district court's decision
to retain jurisdiction even though a year had passed). No published record of the Fifth Circuit's
denial of the appeal exists, so the denial must have been a summary affirmation of the district
court's findings.
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bases its decision on the fact that the time limits in the removal statutes are
procedural and thus subject to waiver.337 Though a circuit split still exists on
the issue,338 the arguments supporting the procedural label are convincing.
The removal statute itself provides for a thirty-day time limit on a motion for
remand based on a procedural defect in removal. 339 This time limit on
remand applies to the thirty-day time limits in § 1446(b) determining when
notice of removal must occur. The Ferguson court makes a strong argument
when it notes that when one time limit in a statute is subject to waiver, so too
should all other time limits absent clear congressional direction otherwise.34 °
The Tedford court made its fatal leap when it allowed the plaintiff's
preremoval actions to act as the waiver.341 Not surprisingly, failure to assert
the time limit after one year has passed would act as a waiver of the ability to
rely on it. On the other hand, the Morrison court, which Tedford cited,342
apparently invented the idea that action prior to the one-year mark can
constitute a waiver.343 Though the idea is certainly up for debate, the
language of the statute and the context in which Congress enacted the one-
year time limit seem to argue against the Tedford construction. The language
of the statute is emphatic, and Congress enacted the provision against a
backdrop of the presumption in favor of remand. Moreover, some courts
have stated that Congress knew of the ability to manipulate when it enacted
337. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423,426 (5th Cir. 2003) (beginning the
analysis with the assertion that the time limits in § 1446(b) are procedural and subject to
waiver).
338. Compare Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a failure to assert the one-year time limit within the § 1447 thirty-day time limit
resulted in a waiver of the right to assert the one-year time limit) with Brock v. Syntex Labs.,
Inc., No. 92-5740, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25714, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1993) (holding that
remand was proper even three months after removal because the one-year time limit was
jurisdictional).
339. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) (requiring a motion for remand within thirty days of
removal to cure procedural defects in the removal).
340. See Ferguson v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 996 F. Supp. 597,603 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
("[T]his Court is unaware of any authority that allows a statute to be subject to one type of
equitable exception but not another.").
341. See Tedford, 423 F.3d at 427 (stating that if a failure to assert the one-year time limit
in a timely manner can act as a waiver, so too can manipulative joinder of a defendant to defeat
removal).
342. See id. at 426 n.4 (citing Morison).
343. See Morrison v. Nat'l Benefit Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (S.D. Miss.
1995) (fashioning the idea that a plaintiff's preremoval actions may constitute a waiver from a
state supreme court case about equitable estoppel and a Fifth Circuit case decided before the
addition of the one-year time limit).
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the one-year time limit and did nothing to guard against such manipulation.344
If these courts are correct in stating that Congress actually contemplated the
ability to manipulatively defeat removal, the Tedford court clearly
overstepped its role when it applied the equitable exception. Unquestionably,
however, Congress decided that one year was the time period, on average, in
which substantial progress had occurred in state court.34 5 Thus, even if
Congress did not actually contemplate the possibility of manipulation,
Tedford still went too far by second guessing Congress's judgment on the
one-year time period.
The second question, whether the Tedford decision or AL revision are
good policies, is easier to answer. The fact of the matter is that neither
solution will solve the perceived problem. At the most basic level, both
policies aim to prevent forum manipulation. 346 Unfortunately, neither policy
will prevent the current manipulative practices, and they may create
additional forum shopping.
The analysis of the post-Tedford cases and the ALI revision shows that
the decision whether to retain jurisdiction will depend upon the court that is
hearing the motion rather than a concrete rule of decision. Looking at the
hypothetical in Part I, the case would qualify for diversity jurisdiction but for
the nondiverse spoiler defendant. The necessary assumption in the Tedford
decision is that the nondiverse defendant is present only to defeat diversity.347
344. See, e.g., Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 n.12 (11th Cir. 1994)
("[C]ongress knew when it passed the one year bar on removal that some plaintiffs would
attempt to defeat diversity by ... joining a nondiverse party."); Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271
F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (N.D. Okla. 2003) ("Congress has recognized and accepted that, in
some circumstances, plaintiff can and will intentionally avoid federal jurisdiction." (quoting
Burns)).
345. See H.R. REP. No. 100-702, at 72(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,6032
(justifying the one-year time limit as "a means of reducing the opportunity for removal after
substantial progress has been made"); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4 (adding new § 1453 at the end of the current removal provisions to
deal with removal of class actions). Congress explicitly exempted class actions from the one-
year time limit of § 1446(b). Id. This exemption lends credence to the argument that, absent
clear congressional intent to the contrary, courts should not invent exemptions to the one-year
time limit. Because class actions typically take more than a year to fully form, Congress has
recognized that the one-year mark is not the point at which substantial progress has been made
in class actions. This recognition is a congressional exception to the rule rather than a judicial
invention.
346. Compare Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2003)
(providing an equitable exception to negate plaintiff's manipulative behavior) with FED.
JUDICIAL CODE REvIsION PROJECT 466 (2004) (replacing the one-year time limit with new
§ 1447(b) because the time limit is "easily abused").
347. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 427 ("Strict application of the one-year limit would
encourage plaintiffs to join nondiverse defendants for 366 days simply to avoid federal court,
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Applying this assumption to the hypothetical, if the court finds that the
nondiverse defendant has no legitimate purpose, the "worst" that happens to
the plaintiff, under both the Tedford and the ALl regime, is that the case
remains in the federal system-exactly where the case would have landed if
the plaintiff had not joined the spoiler defendant and the main defendant had
removed. Thus, the plaintiff has no incentive to refrain from this
manipulative conduct because she has the chance of drawing a court that
favors remand, whereas her only risk is that she stays in the federal system
where she would have ended up had she not engaged in the manipulative
behavior. Over time, if the Tedford exception or the ALl revision become
the controlling law nationally, different courts and judges will acquire a
reputation of ruling one way or the other on these decisions. Plaintiffs may
take note of these federal court reputations when deciding which state court
to choose. Thus, by extension, the same manipulative practices will occur
with the possibility of added forum shopping.
Both the Tedford exception and the ALl revision also require individual
judges to make determinations as to the motive of joining a nondiverse
defendant or pleading a specific amount in controversy. Congress has made
the conscious choice to give litigants broad discretion in thejoinder of parties
and in the pleading requirements. Moreover, reasons other than forum
manipulation, such as enhanced discovery, exist for a plaintiff to join a
defendant against whom she does not intend to proceed. 348 The ALI states
that these reasons are valid, therefore necessitating the judicial determination
that the motive for joinder is forum shopping.349 First, joining a party to take
advantage of the discovery rules seems equally as manipulative as does
joinder to take advantage of the removal rules. Second, this distinction will
do nothing more than teach crafty plaintiffs to request discovery from the
spoiler defendant for the year and then dismiss that defendant, thus defeating
removal.
thereby undermining the very purpose of diversity jurisdiction."); see also supra note 295
(discussing the overbreadth of new § 1447(b) in that the revision may apply to instances other
than forum manipulation). In these nonmanipulation instances when new § 1447(b) may
operate, this assumption of manipulative joinder has no bearing. Thus, this analysis focuses
only on the ALl revision as it would address the situation of forum manipulation.
348. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1) (providing for a certain amount of mandatory
disclosure by a party); FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (allowing a party to serve written interrogatories on
a party, but not on a nonparty).
349. See FED. JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 466 (2004) (stating that the enhanced
discovery options against a party are a legitimate reason to join a party that the plaintiff
otherwise has no interest in pursuing).
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VII. Conclusion
As the foregoing analysis shows, neither the Tedford exception nor the
ALI revision will have a deterrent effect on the practice ofjoining a nondiverse
defendant to avoid federal court. Thus, the Tedford decision can only be an
attempt to judicially revise § 1446(b) to resemble the ALI revision. Factually,
the plaintiffs in Tedford and the other cases applying the exception clearly were
being manipulative. They joined nondiverse defendants without taking any
discovery from them and then dismissed the claims against these defendants
soon after the year had passed. They pleaded only slightly less than the amount
in controversy threshold and then amended their request after a year. The fact
remains, however, that the Tedford court was in no position to second guess
Congress's policy determination that one year is the proper time period to bar
removal. Apart from the impropriety of this judicial legislation, the analysis
also shows that both of these revisions are unworkable in practice. Uniformity
of implementation across the districts is unlikely, if not impossible, because the
policies require individual judges to make inferences as to the motives of a
particular plaintiff. Thus, if these revisions take hold, the effect will be the
puzzling result that whether forum manipulation is allowed will depend on the
individual forum. For these reasons, neither the courts nor Congress should
allow equity or analysis of motive to play a role in the one-year time limit on
removal.
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